Remove HPKP.

This commit is contained in:
Fedor 2020-05-07 14:44:50 +03:00
parent b63142cf64
commit a9e1a524b7
51 changed files with 53 additions and 3751 deletions

View File

@ -9828,7 +9828,7 @@ var Debugger =
var host = httpActivity.hostname;
info.hsts = sss.isSecureHost(sss.HEADER_HSTS, host, flags);
info.hpkp = sss.isSecureHost(sss.HEADER_HPKP, host, flags);
info.hpkp = false;
} else {
DevToolsUtils.reportException("NetworkHelper.parseSecurityInfo", "Could not get HSTS/HPKP status as hostname is not available.");
info.hsts = false;

View File

@ -668,7 +668,8 @@ var NetworkHelper = {
let host = httpActivity.hostname;
info.hsts = sss.isSecureHost(sss.HEADER_HSTS, host, flags);
info.hpkp = sss.isSecureHost(sss.HEADER_HPKP, host, flags);
// HPKP is no longer supported.
info.hpkp = false;
} else {
DevToolsUtils.reportException("NetworkHelper.parseSecurityInfo",
"Could not get HSTS/HPKP status as hostname is not available.");

View File

@ -4948,13 +4948,11 @@ nsDocShell::DisplayLoadError(nsresult aError, nsIURI* aURI,
if (errorClass == nsINSSErrorsService::ERROR_CLASS_BAD_CERT) {
error.AssignLiteral("nssBadCert");
// If this is an HTTP Strict Transport Security host or a pinned host
// and the certificate is bad, don't allow overrides (RFC 6797 section
// 12.1, HPKP draft spec section 2.6).
// If this is an HTTP Strict Transport Security host, don't allow
// overrides (RFC 6797 section 12.1).
uint32_t flags =
UsePrivateBrowsing() ? nsISocketProvider::NO_PERMANENT_STORAGE : 0;
bool isStsHost = false;
bool isPinnedHost = false;
if (XRE_IsParentProcess()) {
nsCOMPtr<nsISiteSecurityService> sss =
do_GetService(NS_SSSERVICE_CONTRACTID, &rv);
@ -4962,9 +4960,6 @@ nsDocShell::DisplayLoadError(nsresult aError, nsIURI* aURI,
rv = sss->IsSecureURI(nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HSTS, aURI,
flags, nullptr, &isStsHost);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
rv = sss->IsSecureURI(nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HPKP, aURI,
flags, nullptr, &isPinnedHost);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
} else {
mozilla::dom::ContentChild* cc =
mozilla::dom::ContentChild::GetSingleton();
@ -4972,8 +4967,6 @@ nsDocShell::DisplayLoadError(nsresult aError, nsIURI* aURI,
SerializeURI(aURI, uri);
cc->SendIsSecureURI(nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HSTS, uri, flags,
&isStsHost);
cc->SendIsSecureURI(nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HPKP, uri, flags,
&isPinnedHost);
}
if (Preferences::GetBool(
@ -4981,11 +4974,9 @@ nsDocShell::DisplayLoadError(nsresult aError, nsIURI* aURI,
cssClass.AssignLiteral("expertBadCert");
}
// HSTS/pinning takes precedence over the expert bad cert pref. We
// HSTS takes precedence over the expert bad cert pref. We
// never want to show the "Add Exception" button for these sites.
// In the future we should differentiate between an HSTS host and a
// pinned host and display a more informative message to the user.
if (isStsHost || isPinnedHost) {
if (isStsHost) {
cssClass.AssignLiteral("badStsCert");
}

View File

@ -120,27 +120,6 @@ pref("security.webauth.u2f_enable_usbtoken", false);
// OCSP must-staple
pref("security.ssl.enable_ocsp_must_staple", true);
// HPKP settings
// Enable pinning checks by default.
pref("security.cert_pinning.enforcement_level", 2);
// Do not process hpkp headers rooted by not built in roots by default.
// This is to prevent accidental pinning from MITM devices and is used
// for tests.
pref("security.cert_pinning.process_headers_from_non_builtin_roots", false);
// Impose a maximum age on HPKP headers, to avoid sites getting permanently
// blacking themselves out by setting a bad pin. (60 days by default)
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7469#section-4.1
pref("security.cert_pinning.max_max_age_seconds", 5184000);
// Controls whether or not HPKP (the HTTP Public Key Pinning header) is enabled.
// If true, the header is processed and collected HPKP information is consulted
// when looking for pinning information.
// If false, the header is not processed and collected HPKP information is not
// consulted when looking for pinning information. Preloaded pins are not
// affected by this preference.
// Default: false
pref("security.cert_pinning.hpkp.enabled", false);
// If a request is mixed-content, send an HSTS priming request to attempt to
// see if it is available over HTTPS.
pref("security.mixed_content.send_hsts_priming", true);

View File

@ -1529,7 +1529,7 @@ GetPKPConsoleErrorTag(uint32_t failureResult, nsAString& consoleErrorTag)
}
/**
* Process a single security header. Only two types are supported: HSTS and HPKP.
* Process a single security header. Only one type is supported: HSTS.
*/
nsresult
nsHttpChannel::ProcessSingleSecurityHeader(uint32_t aType,
@ -1541,9 +1541,6 @@ nsHttpChannel::ProcessSingleSecurityHeader(uint32_t aType,
case nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HSTS:
atom = nsHttp::ResolveAtom("Strict-Transport-Security");
break;
case nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HPKP:
atom = nsHttp::ResolveAtom("Public-Key-Pins");
break;
default:
NS_NOTREACHED("Invalid security header type");
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
@ -1567,10 +1564,6 @@ nsHttpChannel::ProcessSingleSecurityHeader(uint32_t aType,
GetSTSConsoleErrorTag(failureResult, consoleErrorTag);
consoleErrorCategory = NS_LITERAL_STRING("Invalid HSTS Headers");
break;
case nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HPKP:
GetPKPConsoleErrorTag(failureResult, consoleErrorTag);
consoleErrorCategory = NS_LITERAL_STRING("Invalid HPKP Headers");
break;
default:
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
@ -1640,10 +1633,6 @@ nsHttpChannel::ProcessSecurityHeaders()
sslStatus, flags);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
rv = ProcessSingleSecurityHeader(nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HPKP,
sslStatus, flags);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
return NS_OK;
}

View File

@ -12,7 +12,6 @@
#include "NSSErrorsService.h"
#include "OCSPRequestor.h"
#include "OCSPVerificationTrustDomain.h"
#include "PublicKeyPinningService.h"
#include "cert.h"
#include "certdb.h"
#include "mozilla/Assertions.h"
@ -862,24 +861,6 @@ NSSCertDBTrustDomain::IsChainValid(const DERArray& certArray, Time time)
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
bool skipPinningChecksBecauseOfMITMMode =
(!isBuiltInRoot && mPinningMode == CertVerifier::pinningAllowUserCAMITM);
// If mHostname isn't set, we're not verifying in the context of a TLS
// handshake, so don't verify HPKP in those cases.
if (mHostname && (mPinningMode != CertVerifier::pinningDisabled) &&
!skipPinningChecksBecauseOfMITMMode) {
bool enforceTestMode =
(mPinningMode == CertVerifier::pinningEnforceTestMode);
bool chainHasValidPins;
nsresult nsrv = PublicKeyPinningService::ChainHasValidPins(
certList, mHostname, time, enforceTestMode, chainHasValidPins);
if (NS_FAILED(nsrv)) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
if (!chainHasValidPins) {
return Result::ERROR_KEY_PINNING_FAILURE;
}
}
mBuiltChain = Move(certList);

View File

@ -1,333 +0,0 @@
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "PublicKeyPinningService.h"
#include "mozilla/Base64.h"
#include "mozilla/Casting.h"
#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
#include "nsISiteSecurityService.h"
#include "nsServiceManagerUtils.h"
#include "nsSiteSecurityService.h"
#include "nssb64.h"
#include "pkix/pkixtypes.h"
#include "seccomon.h"
#include "sechash.h"
#include "StaticHPKPins.h" // autogenerated by genHPKPStaticpins.js
using namespace mozilla;
using namespace mozilla::pkix;
using namespace mozilla::psm;
LazyLogModule gPublicKeyPinningLog("PublicKeyPinningService");
/**
Computes in the location specified by base64Out the SHA256 digest
of the DER Encoded subject Public Key Info for the given cert
*/
static nsresult
GetBase64HashSPKI(const CERTCertificate* cert, nsACString& hashSPKIDigest)
{
hashSPKIDigest.Truncate();
Digest digest;
nsresult rv = digest.DigestBuf(SEC_OID_SHA256, cert->derPublicKey.data,
cert->derPublicKey.len);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
return Base64Encode(nsDependentCSubstring(
BitwiseCast<char*, unsigned char*>(digest.get().data),
digest.get().len),
hashSPKIDigest);
}
/*
* Sets certMatchesPinset to true if a given cert matches any fingerprints from
* the given pinset or the dynamicFingerprints array, or to false otherwise.
*/
static nsresult
EvalCert(const CERTCertificate* cert, const StaticFingerprints* fingerprints,
const nsTArray<nsCString>* dynamicFingerprints,
/*out*/ bool& certMatchesPinset)
{
certMatchesPinset = false;
if (!fingerprints && !dynamicFingerprints) {
MOZ_LOG(gPublicKeyPinningLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("pkpin: No hashes found\n"));
return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
}
nsAutoCString base64Out;
nsresult rv = GetBase64HashSPKI(cert, base64Out);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
MOZ_LOG(gPublicKeyPinningLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("pkpin: GetBase64HashSPKI failed!\n"));
return rv;
}
if (fingerprints) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < fingerprints->size; i++) {
if (base64Out.Equals(fingerprints->data[i])) {
MOZ_LOG(gPublicKeyPinningLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("pkpin: found pin base_64 ='%s'\n", base64Out.get()));
certMatchesPinset = true;
return NS_OK;
}
}
}
if (dynamicFingerprints) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < dynamicFingerprints->Length(); i++) {
if (base64Out.Equals((*dynamicFingerprints)[i])) {
MOZ_LOG(gPublicKeyPinningLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("pkpin: found pin base_64 ='%s'\n", base64Out.get()));
certMatchesPinset = true;
return NS_OK;
}
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
/*
* Sets certListIntersectsPinset to true if a given chain matches any
* fingerprints from the given static fingerprints or the
* dynamicFingerprints array, or to false otherwise.
*/
static nsresult
EvalChain(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList,
const StaticFingerprints* fingerprints,
const nsTArray<nsCString>* dynamicFingerprints,
/*out*/ bool& certListIntersectsPinset)
{
certListIntersectsPinset = false;
CERTCertificate* currentCert;
if (!fingerprints && !dynamicFingerprints) {
MOZ_ASSERT(false, "Must pass in at least one type of pinset");
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
CERTCertListNode* node;
for (node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(certList); !CERT_LIST_END(node, certList);
node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node)) {
currentCert = node->cert;
MOZ_LOG(gPublicKeyPinningLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("pkpin: certArray subject: '%s'\n", currentCert->subjectName));
MOZ_LOG(gPublicKeyPinningLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("pkpin: certArray issuer: '%s'\n", currentCert->issuerName));
nsresult rv = EvalCert(currentCert, fingerprints, dynamicFingerprints,
certListIntersectsPinset);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
if (certListIntersectsPinset) {
return NS_OK;
}
}
MOZ_LOG(gPublicKeyPinningLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("pkpin: no matches found\n"));
return NS_OK;
}
/**
Comparator for the is public key pinned host.
*/
static int
TransportSecurityPreloadCompare(const void* key, const void* entry) {
auto keyStr = static_cast<const char*>(key);
auto preloadEntry = static_cast<const TransportSecurityPreload*>(entry);
return strcmp(keyStr, preloadEntry->mHost);
}
nsresult
PublicKeyPinningService::ChainMatchesPinset(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList,
const nsTArray<nsCString>& aSHA256keys,
/*out*/ bool& chainMatchesPinset)
{
return EvalChain(certList, nullptr, &aSHA256keys, chainMatchesPinset);
}
// Returns via one of the output parameters the most relevant pinning
// information that is valid for the given host at the given time.
// Dynamic pins are prioritized over static pins.
static nsresult
FindPinningInformation(const char* hostname, mozilla::pkix::Time time,
/*out*/ nsTArray<nsCString>& dynamicFingerprints,
/*out*/ TransportSecurityPreload*& staticFingerprints)
{
if (!hostname || hostname[0] == 0) {
return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
}
staticFingerprints = nullptr;
dynamicFingerprints.Clear();
nsCOMPtr<nsISiteSecurityService> sssService =
do_GetService(NS_SSSERVICE_CONTRACTID);
if (!sssService) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
TransportSecurityPreload* foundEntry = nullptr;
char* evalHost = const_cast<char*>(hostname);
char* evalPart;
// Notice how the (xx = strchr) prevents pins for unqualified domain names.
while (!foundEntry && (evalPart = strchr(evalHost, '.'))) {
MOZ_LOG(gPublicKeyPinningLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("pkpin: Querying pinsets for host: '%s'\n", evalHost));
// Attempt dynamic pins first
nsresult rv;
bool found;
bool includeSubdomains;
nsTArray<nsCString> pinArray;
rv = sssService->GetKeyPinsForHostname(evalHost, time, pinArray,
&includeSubdomains, &found);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
if (found && (evalHost == hostname || includeSubdomains)) {
MOZ_LOG(gPublicKeyPinningLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("pkpin: Found dyn match for host: '%s'\n", evalHost));
dynamicFingerprints = pinArray;
return NS_OK;
}
foundEntry = (TransportSecurityPreload *)bsearch(evalHost,
kPublicKeyPinningPreloadList,
sizeof(kPublicKeyPinningPreloadList) / sizeof(TransportSecurityPreload),
sizeof(TransportSecurityPreload),
TransportSecurityPreloadCompare);
if (foundEntry) {
MOZ_LOG(gPublicKeyPinningLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("pkpin: Found pinset for host: '%s'\n", evalHost));
if (evalHost != hostname) {
if (!foundEntry->mIncludeSubdomains) {
// Does not apply to this host, continue iterating
foundEntry = nullptr;
}
}
} else {
MOZ_LOG(gPublicKeyPinningLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("pkpin: Didn't find pinset for host: '%s'\n", evalHost));
}
// Add one for '.'
evalHost = evalPart + 1;
}
if (foundEntry && foundEntry->pinset) {
if (time > TimeFromEpochInSeconds(kPreloadPKPinsExpirationTime /
PR_USEC_PER_SEC)) {
return NS_OK;
}
staticFingerprints = foundEntry;
}
return NS_OK;
}
// Returns true via the output parameter if the given certificate list meets
// pinning requirements for the given host at the given time. It must be the
// case that either there is an intersection between the set of hashes of
// subject public key info data in the list and the most relevant non-expired
// pinset for the host or there is no pinning information for the host.
static nsresult
CheckPinsForHostname(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList, const char* hostname,
bool enforceTestMode, mozilla::pkix::Time time,
/*out*/ bool& chainHasValidPins)
{
chainHasValidPins = false;
if (!certList) {
return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
}
if (!hostname || hostname[0] == 0) {
return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
}
nsTArray<nsCString> dynamicFingerprints;
TransportSecurityPreload* staticFingerprints = nullptr;
nsresult rv = FindPinningInformation(hostname, time, dynamicFingerprints,
staticFingerprints);
// If we have no pinning information, the certificate chain trivially
// validates with respect to pinning.
if (dynamicFingerprints.Length() == 0 && !staticFingerprints) {
chainHasValidPins = true;
return NS_OK;
}
if (dynamicFingerprints.Length() > 0) {
return EvalChain(certList, nullptr, &dynamicFingerprints, chainHasValidPins);
}
if (staticFingerprints) {
bool enforceTestModeResult;
rv = EvalChain(certList, staticFingerprints->pinset, nullptr,
enforceTestModeResult);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
chainHasValidPins = enforceTestModeResult;
if (staticFingerprints->mTestMode) {
if (!enforceTestMode) {
chainHasValidPins = true;
}
}
MOZ_LOG(gPublicKeyPinningLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("pkpin: Pin check %s for %s host '%s' (mode=%s)\n",
enforceTestModeResult ? "passed" : "failed",
staticFingerprints->mIsMoz ? "mozilla" : "non-mozilla",
hostname, staticFingerprints->mTestMode ? "test" : "production"));
}
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult
PublicKeyPinningService::ChainHasValidPins(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList,
const char* hostname,
mozilla::pkix::Time time,
bool enforceTestMode,
/*out*/ bool& chainHasValidPins)
{
chainHasValidPins = false;
if (!certList) {
return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
}
if (!hostname || hostname[0] == 0) {
return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
}
nsAutoCString canonicalizedHostname(CanonicalizeHostname(hostname));
return CheckPinsForHostname(certList, canonicalizedHostname.get(),
enforceTestMode, time, chainHasValidPins);
}
nsresult
PublicKeyPinningService::HostHasPins(const char* hostname,
mozilla::pkix::Time time,
bool enforceTestMode,
/*out*/ bool& hostHasPins)
{
hostHasPins = false;
nsAutoCString canonicalizedHostname(CanonicalizeHostname(hostname));
nsTArray<nsCString> dynamicFingerprints;
TransportSecurityPreload* staticFingerprints = nullptr;
nsresult rv = FindPinningInformation(canonicalizedHostname.get(), time,
dynamicFingerprints, staticFingerprints);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
if (dynamicFingerprints.Length() > 0) {
hostHasPins = true;
} else if (staticFingerprints) {
hostHasPins = !staticFingerprints->mTestMode || enforceTestMode;
}
return NS_OK;
}
nsAutoCString
PublicKeyPinningService::CanonicalizeHostname(const char* hostname)
{
nsAutoCString canonicalizedHostname(hostname);
ToLowerCase(canonicalizedHostname);
while (canonicalizedHostname.Length() > 0 &&
canonicalizedHostname.Last() == '.') {
canonicalizedHostname.Truncate(canonicalizedHostname.Length() - 1);
}
return canonicalizedHostname;
}

View File

@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#ifndef PublicKeyPinningService_h
#define PublicKeyPinningService_h
#include "CertVerifier.h"
#include "ScopedNSSTypes.h"
#include "cert.h"
#include "nsString.h"
#include "nsTArray.h"
#include "pkix/Time.h"
namespace mozilla {
namespace psm {
class PublicKeyPinningService
{
public:
/**
* Sets chainHasValidPins to true if the given (host, certList) passes pinning
* checks, or to false otherwise. If the host is pinned, returns true via
* chainHasValidPins if one of the keys in the given certificate chain matches
* the pin set specified by the hostname. The certList's head is the EE cert
* and the tail is the trust anchor.
* Note: if an alt name is a wildcard, it won't necessarily find a pinset
* that would otherwise be valid for it
*/
static nsresult ChainHasValidPins(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList,
const char* hostname,
mozilla::pkix::Time time,
bool enforceTestMode,
/*out*/ bool& chainHasValidPins);
/**
* Sets chainMatchesPinset to true if there is any intersection between the
* certificate list and the pins specified in the aSHA256keys array.
* Values passed in are assumed to be in base64 encoded form.
*/
static nsresult ChainMatchesPinset(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList,
const nsTArray<nsCString>& aSHA256keys,
/*out*/ bool& chainMatchesPinset);
/**
* Returns true via the output parameter hostHasPins if there is pinning
* information for the given host that is valid at the given time, and false
* otherwise.
*/
static nsresult HostHasPins(const char* hostname,
mozilla::pkix::Time time,
bool enforceTestMode,
/*out*/ bool& hostHasPins);
/**
* Given a hostname of potentially mixed case with potentially multiple
* trailing '.' (see bug 1118522), canonicalizes it to lowercase with no
* trailing '.'.
*/
static nsAutoCString CanonicalizeHostname(const char* hostname);
};
}} // namespace mozilla::psm
#endif // PublicKeyPinningService_h

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@ -425,11 +425,9 @@ CertErrorRunnable::CheckCertOverrides()
uint32_t remaining_display_errors = mCollectedErrors;
// If this is an HTTP Strict Transport Security host or a pinned host and the
// certificate is bad, don't allow overrides (RFC 6797 section 12.1,
// HPKP draft spec section 2.6).
// If this is an HTTP Strict Transport Security host, don't allow overrides
// RFC 6797 section 12.1.
bool strictTransportSecurityEnabled = false;
bool hasPinningInformation = false;
nsCOMPtr<nsISiteSecurityService> sss(do_GetService(NS_SSSERVICE_CONTRACTID));
if (!sss) {
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
@ -449,21 +447,10 @@ CertErrorRunnable::CheckCertOverrides()
return new SSLServerCertVerificationResult(mInfoObject,
mDefaultErrorCodeToReport);
}
nsrv = sss->IsSecureHost(nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HPKP,
mInfoObject->GetHostNameRaw(),
mProviderFlags,
nullptr,
&hasPinningInformation);
if (NS_FAILED(nsrv)) {
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("[%p][%p] checking for HPKP failed\n", mFdForLogging, this));
return new SSLServerCertVerificationResult(mInfoObject,
mDefaultErrorCodeToReport);
}
if (!strictTransportSecurityEnabled && !hasPinningInformation) {
if (!strictTransportSecurityEnabled) {
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("[%p][%p] no HSTS or HPKP - overrides allowed\n",
("[%p][%p] no HSTS - overrides allowed\n",
mFdForLogging, this));
nsCOMPtr<nsICertOverrideService> overrideService =
do_GetService(NS_CERTOVERRIDE_CONTRACTID);
@ -497,7 +484,7 @@ CertErrorRunnable::CheckCertOverrides()
}
} else {
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("[%p][%p] HSTS or HPKP - no overrides allowed\n",
("[%p][%p] HSTS - no overrides allowed\n",
mFdForLogging, this));
}

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@ -1,712 +0,0 @@
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
/*****************************************************************************/
/* This is an automatically generated file. If you're not */
/* PublicKeyPinningService.cpp, you shouldn't be #including it. */
/*****************************************************************************/
#include <stdint.h>
/* AddTrust External Root */
static const char kAddTrust_External_RootFingerprint[] =
"lCppFqbkrlJ3EcVFAkeip0+44VaoJUymbnOaEUk7tEU=";
/* AddTrust Low-Value Services Root */
static const char kAddTrust_Low_Value_Services_RootFingerprint[] =
"BStocQfshOhzA4JFLsKidFF0XXSFpX1vRk4Np6G2ryo=";
/* AddTrust Public Services Root */
static const char kAddTrust_Public_Services_RootFingerprint[] =
"OGHXtpYfzbISBFb/b8LrdwSxp0G0vZM6g3b14ZFcppg=";
/* AddTrust Qualified Certificates Root */
static const char kAddTrust_Qualified_Certificates_RootFingerprint[] =
"xzr8Lrp3DQy8HuQfJStS6Kk9ErctzOwDHY2DnL+Bink=";
/* AffirmTrust Commercial */
static const char kAffirmTrust_CommercialFingerprint[] =
"bEZLmlsjOl6HTadlwm8EUBDS3c/0V5TwtMfkqvpQFJU=";
/* AffirmTrust Networking */
static const char kAffirmTrust_NetworkingFingerprint[] =
"lAcq0/WPcPkwmOWl9sBMlscQvYSdgxhJGa6Q64kK5AA=";
/* AffirmTrust Premium */
static const char kAffirmTrust_PremiumFingerprint[] =
"x/Q7TPW3FWgpT4IrU3YmBfbd0Vyt7Oc56eLDy6YenWc=";
/* AffirmTrust Premium ECC */
static const char kAffirmTrust_Premium_ECCFingerprint[] =
"MhmwkRT/SVo+tusAwu/qs0ACrl8KVsdnnqCHo/oDfk8=";
/* Baltimore CyberTrust Root */
static const char kBaltimore_CyberTrust_RootFingerprint[] =
"Y9mvm0exBk1JoQ57f9Vm28jKo5lFm/woKcVxrYxu80o=";
/* COMODO Certification Authority */
static const char kCOMODO_Certification_AuthorityFingerprint[] =
"AG1751Vd2CAmRCxPGieoDomhmJy4ezREjtIZTBgZbV4=";
/* COMODO ECC Certification Authority */
static const char kCOMODO_ECC_Certification_AuthorityFingerprint[] =
"58qRu/uxh4gFezqAcERupSkRYBlBAvfcw7mEjGPLnNU=";
/* COMODO RSA Certification Authority */
static const char kCOMODO_RSA_Certification_AuthorityFingerprint[] =
"grX4Ta9HpZx6tSHkmCrvpApTQGo67CYDnvprLg5yRME=";
/* Comodo AAA Services root */
static const char kComodo_AAA_Services_rootFingerprint[] =
"vRU+17BDT2iGsXvOi76E7TQMcTLXAqj0+jGPdW7L1vM=";
/* Comodo Secure Services root */
static const char kComodo_Secure_Services_rootFingerprint[] =
"RpHL/ehKa2BS3b4VK7DCFq4lqG5XR4E9vA8UfzOFcL4=";
/* Comodo Trusted Services root */
static const char kComodo_Trusted_Services_rootFingerprint[] =
"4tiR77c4ZpEF1TDeXtcuKyrD9KZweLU0mz/ayklvXrg=";
/* Cybertrust Global Root */
static const char kCybertrust_Global_RootFingerprint[] =
"foeCwVDOOVL4AuY2AjpdPpW7XWjjPoWtsroXgSXOvxU=";
/* DST Root CA X3 */
static const char kDST_Root_CA_X3Fingerprint[] =
"Vjs8r4z+80wjNcr1YKepWQboSIRi63WsWXhIMN+eWys=";
/* DigiCert Assured ID Root CA */
static const char kDigiCert_Assured_ID_Root_CAFingerprint[] =
"I/Lt/z7ekCWanjD0Cvj5EqXls2lOaThEA0H2Bg4BT/o=";
/* DigiCert Assured ID Root G2 */
static const char kDigiCert_Assured_ID_Root_G2Fingerprint[] =
"8ca6Zwz8iOTfUpc8rkIPCgid1HQUT+WAbEIAZOFZEik=";
/* DigiCert Assured ID Root G3 */
static const char kDigiCert_Assured_ID_Root_G3Fingerprint[] =
"Fe7TOVlLME+M+Ee0dzcdjW/sYfTbKwGvWJ58U7Ncrkw=";
/* DigiCert Global Root CA */
static const char kDigiCert_Global_Root_CAFingerprint[] =
"r/mIkG3eEpVdm+u/ko/cwxzOMo1bk4TyHIlByibiA5E=";
/* DigiCert Global Root G2 */
static const char kDigiCert_Global_Root_G2Fingerprint[] =
"i7WTqTvh0OioIruIfFR4kMPnBqrS2rdiVPl/s2uC/CY=";
/* DigiCert Global Root G3 */
static const char kDigiCert_Global_Root_G3Fingerprint[] =
"uUwZgwDOxcBXrQcntwu+kYFpkiVkOaezL0WYEZ3anJc=";
/* DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA */
static const char kDigiCert_High_Assurance_EV_Root_CAFingerprint[] =
"WoiWRyIOVNa9ihaBciRSC7XHjliYS9VwUGOIud4PB18=";
/* DigiCert Trusted Root G4 */
static const char kDigiCert_Trusted_Root_G4Fingerprint[] =
"Wd8xe/qfTwq3ylFNd3IpaqLHZbh2ZNCLluVzmeNkcpw=";
/* End Entity Test Cert */
static const char kEnd_Entity_Test_CertFingerprint[] =
"VCIlmPM9NkgFQtrs4Oa5TeFcDu6MWRTKSNdePEhOgD8=";
/* Entrust Root Certification Authority */
static const char kEntrust_Root_Certification_AuthorityFingerprint[] =
"bb+uANN7nNc/j7R95lkXrwDg3d9C286sIMF8AnXuIJU=";
/* Entrust Root Certification Authority - EC1 */
static const char kEntrust_Root_Certification_Authority___EC1Fingerprint[] =
"/qK31kX7pz11PB7Jp4cMQOH3sMVh6Se5hb9xGGbjbyI=";
/* Entrust Root Certification Authority - G2 */
static const char kEntrust_Root_Certification_Authority___G2Fingerprint[] =
"du6FkDdMcVQ3u8prumAo6t3i3G27uMP2EOhR8R0at/U=";
/* Entrust.net Premium 2048 Secure Server CA */
static const char kEntrust_net_Premium_2048_Secure_Server_CAFingerprint[] =
"HqPF5D7WbC2imDpCpKebHpBnhs6fG1hiFBmgBGOofTg=";
/* FacebookBackup */
static const char kFacebookBackupFingerprint[] =
"q4PO2G2cbkZhZ82+JgmRUyGMoAeozA+BSXVXQWB8XWQ=";
/* GOOGLE_PIN_COMODORSADomainValidationSecureServerCA */
static const char kGOOGLE_PIN_COMODORSADomainValidationSecureServerCAFingerprint[] =
"klO23nT2ehFDXCfx3eHTDRESMz3asj1muO+4aIdjiuY=";
/* GOOGLE_PIN_DigiCertECCSecureServerCA */
static const char kGOOGLE_PIN_DigiCertECCSecureServerCAFingerprint[] =
"PZXN3lRAy+8tBKk2Ox6F7jIlnzr2Yzmwqc3JnyfXoCw=";
/* GOOGLE_PIN_DigiCertSHA2HighAssuranceServerCA */
static const char kGOOGLE_PIN_DigiCertSHA2HighAssuranceServerCAFingerprint[] =
"k2v657xBsOVe1PQRwOsHsw3bsGT2VzIqz5K+59sNQws=";
/* GOOGLE_PIN_Entrust_SSL */
static const char kGOOGLE_PIN_Entrust_SSLFingerprint[] =
"nsxRNo6G40YPZsKV5JQt1TCA8nseQQr/LRqp1Oa8fnw=";
/* GOOGLE_PIN_GTECyberTrustGlobalRoot */
static const char kGOOGLE_PIN_GTECyberTrustGlobalRootFingerprint[] =
"EGn6R6CqT4z3ERscrqNl7q7RC//zJmDe9uBhS/rnCHU=";
/* GOOGLE_PIN_GoDaddySecure */
static const char kGOOGLE_PIN_GoDaddySecureFingerprint[] =
"MrZLZnJ6IGPkBm87lYywqu5Xal7O/ZUzmbuIdHMdlYc=";
/* GOOGLE_PIN_GoogleG2 */
static const char kGOOGLE_PIN_GoogleG2Fingerprint[] =
"7HIpactkIAq2Y49orFOOQKurWxmmSFZhBCoQYcRhJ3Y=";
/* GOOGLE_PIN_LetsEncryptAuthorityBackup_X2_X4 */
static const char kGOOGLE_PIN_LetsEncryptAuthorityBackup_X2_X4Fingerprint[] =
"sRHdihwgkaib1P1gxX8HFszlD+7/gTfNvuAybgLPNis=";
/* GOOGLE_PIN_LetsEncryptAuthorityPrimary_X1_X3 */
static const char kGOOGLE_PIN_LetsEncryptAuthorityPrimary_X1_X3Fingerprint[] =
"YLh1dUR9y6Kja30RrAn7JKnbQG/uEtLMkBgFF2Fuihg=";
/* GOOGLE_PIN_RapidSSL */
static const char kGOOGLE_PIN_RapidSSLFingerprint[] =
"lT09gPUeQfbYrlxRtpsHrjDblj9Rpz+u7ajfCrg4qDM=";
/* GOOGLE_PIN_SymantecClass3EVG3 */
static const char kGOOGLE_PIN_SymantecClass3EVG3Fingerprint[] =
"gMxWOrX4PMQesK9qFNbYBxjBfjUvlkn/vN1n+L9lE5E=";
/* GOOGLE_PIN_UTNDATACorpSGC */
static const char kGOOGLE_PIN_UTNDATACorpSGCFingerprint[] =
"QAL80xHQczFWfnG82XHkYEjI3OjRZZcRdTs9qiommvo=";
/* GOOGLE_PIN_VeriSignClass1 */
static const char kGOOGLE_PIN_VeriSignClass1Fingerprint[] =
"LclHC+Y+9KzxvYKGCUArt7h72ZY4pkOTTohoLRvowwg=";
/* GOOGLE_PIN_VeriSignClass2_G2 */
static const char kGOOGLE_PIN_VeriSignClass2_G2Fingerprint[] =
"2oALgLKofTmeZvoZ1y/fSZg7R9jPMix8eVA6DH4o/q8=";
/* GOOGLE_PIN_VeriSignClass3_G2 */
static const char kGOOGLE_PIN_VeriSignClass3_G2Fingerprint[] =
"AjyBzOjnxk+pQtPBUEhwfTXZu1uH9PVExb8bxWQ68vo=";
/* GOOGLE_PIN_VeriSignClass4_G3 */
static const char kGOOGLE_PIN_VeriSignClass4_G3Fingerprint[] =
"VnuCEf0g09KD7gzXzgZyy52ZvFtIeljJ1U7Gf3fUqPU=";
/* GeoTrust Global CA */
static const char kGeoTrust_Global_CAFingerprint[] =
"h6801m+z8v3zbgkRHpq6L29Esgfzhj89C1SyUCOQmqU=";
/* GeoTrust Global CA 2 */
static const char kGeoTrust_Global_CA_2Fingerprint[] =
"F3VaXClfPS1y5vAxofB/QAxYi55YKyLxfq4xoVkNEYU=";
/* GeoTrust Primary Certification Authority */
static const char kGeoTrust_Primary_Certification_AuthorityFingerprint[] =
"SQVGZiOrQXi+kqxcvWWE96HhfydlLVqFr4lQTqI5qqo=";
/* GeoTrust Primary Certification Authority - G2 */
static const char kGeoTrust_Primary_Certification_Authority___G2Fingerprint[] =
"vPtEqrmtAhAVcGtBIep2HIHJ6IlnWQ9vlK50TciLePs=";
/* GeoTrust Primary Certification Authority - G3 */
static const char kGeoTrust_Primary_Certification_Authority___G3Fingerprint[] =
"q5hJUnat8eyv8o81xTBIeB5cFxjaucjmelBPT2pRMo8=";
/* GeoTrust Universal CA */
static const char kGeoTrust_Universal_CAFingerprint[] =
"lpkiXF3lLlbN0y3y6W0c/qWqPKC7Us2JM8I7XCdEOCA=";
/* GeoTrust Universal CA 2 */
static const char kGeoTrust_Universal_CA_2Fingerprint[] =
"fKoDRlEkWQxgHlZ+UhSOlSwM/+iQAFMP4NlbbVDqrkE=";
/* GlobalSign ECC Root CA - R4 */
static const char kGlobalSign_ECC_Root_CA___R4Fingerprint[] =
"CLOmM1/OXvSPjw5UOYbAf9GKOxImEp9hhku9W90fHMk=";
/* GlobalSign ECC Root CA - R5 */
static const char kGlobalSign_ECC_Root_CA___R5Fingerprint[] =
"fg6tdrtoGdwvVFEahDVPboswe53YIFjqbABPAdndpd8=";
/* GlobalSign Root CA */
static const char kGlobalSign_Root_CAFingerprint[] =
"K87oWBWM9UZfyddvDfoxL+8lpNyoUB2ptGtn0fv6G2Q=";
/* GlobalSign Root CA - R2 */
static const char kGlobalSign_Root_CA___R2Fingerprint[] =
"iie1VXtL7HzAMF+/PVPR9xzT80kQxdZeJ+zduCB3uj0=";
/* GlobalSign Root CA - R3 */
static const char kGlobalSign_Root_CA___R3Fingerprint[] =
"cGuxAXyFXFkWm61cF4HPWX8S0srS9j0aSqN0k4AP+4A=";
/* Go Daddy Class 2 CA */
static const char kGo_Daddy_Class_2_CAFingerprint[] =
"VjLZe/p3W/PJnd6lL8JVNBCGQBZynFLdZSTIqcO0SJ8=";
/* Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2 */
static const char kGo_Daddy_Root_Certificate_Authority___G2Fingerprint[] =
"Ko8tivDrEjiY90yGasP6ZpBU4jwXvHqVvQI0GS3GNdA=";
/* GoogleBackup2048 */
static const char kGoogleBackup2048Fingerprint[] =
"IPMbDAjLVSGntGO3WP53X/zilCVndez5YJ2+vJvhJsA=";
/* SpiderOak2 */
static const char kSpiderOak2Fingerprint[] =
"7Y3UnxbffL8aFPXsOJBpGasgpDmngpIhAxGKdQRklQQ=";
/* SpiderOak3 */
static const char kSpiderOak3Fingerprint[] =
"LkER54vOdlygpTsbYvlpMq1CE/lDAG1AP9xmdtwvV2A=";
/* Starfield Class 2 CA */
static const char kStarfield_Class_2_CAFingerprint[] =
"FfFKxFycfaIz00eRZOgTf+Ne4POK6FgYPwhBDqgqxLQ=";
/* Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G2 */
static const char kStarfield_Root_Certificate_Authority___G2Fingerprint[] =
"gI1os/q0iEpflxrOfRBVDXqVoWN3Tz7Dav/7IT++THQ=";
/* Swehack */
static const char kSwehackFingerprint[] =
"FdaffE799rVb3oyAuhJ2mBW/XJwD07Uajb2G6YwSAEw=";
/* SwehackBackup */
static const char kSwehackBackupFingerprint[] =
"z6cuswA6E1vgFkCjUsbEYo0Lf3aP8M8YOvwkoiGzDCo=";
/* TestSPKI */
static const char kTestSPKIFingerprint[] =
"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=";
/* Tor1 */
static const char kTor1Fingerprint[] =
"bYz9JTDk89X3qu3fgswG+lBQso5vI0N1f0Rx4go4nLo=";
/* Tor2 */
static const char kTor2Fingerprint[] =
"xXCxhTdn7uxXneJSbQCqoAvuW3ZtQl2pDVTf2sewS8w=";
/* Tor3 */
static const char kTor3Fingerprint[] =
"CleC1qwUR8JPgH1nXvSe2VHxDe5/KfNs96EusbfSOfo=";
/* TumblrBackup */
static const char kTumblrBackupFingerprint[] =
"avlD96PLERV78IN1fD+ab5cupkUDD9wTZWJjHX6VC9w=";
/* Twitter1 */
static const char kTwitter1Fingerprint[] =
"vU9M48LzD/CF34wE5PPf4nBwRyosy06X21J0ap8yS5s=";
/* USERTrust ECC Certification Authority */
static const char kUSERTrust_ECC_Certification_AuthorityFingerprint[] =
"ICGRfpgmOUXIWcQ/HXPLQTkFPEFPoDyjvH7ohhQpjzs=";
/* USERTrust RSA Certification Authority */
static const char kUSERTrust_RSA_Certification_AuthorityFingerprint[] =
"x4QzPSC810K5/cMjb05Qm4k3Bw5zBn4lTdO/nEW/Td4=";
/* UTN USERFirst Email Root CA */
static const char kUTN_USERFirst_Email_Root_CAFingerprint[] =
"Laj56jRU0hFGRko/nQKNxMf7tXscUsc8KwVyovWZotM=";
/* UTN USERFirst Hardware Root CA */
static const char kUTN_USERFirst_Hardware_Root_CAFingerprint[] =
"TUDnr0MEoJ3of7+YliBMBVFB4/gJsv5zO7IxD9+YoWI=";
/* UTN USERFirst Object Root CA */
static const char kUTN_USERFirst_Object_Root_CAFingerprint[] =
"D+FMJksXu28NZT56cOs2Pb9UvhWAOe3a5cJXEd9IwQM=";
/* VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G4 */
static const char kVeriSign_Class_3_Public_Primary_Certification_Authority___G4Fingerprint[] =
"UZJDjsNp1+4M5x9cbbdflB779y5YRBcV6Z6rBMLIrO4=";
/* VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5 */
static const char kVeriSign_Class_3_Public_Primary_Certification_Authority___G5Fingerprint[] =
"JbQbUG5JMJUoI6brnx0x3vZF6jilxsapbXGVfjhN8Fg=";
/* VeriSign Universal Root Certification Authority */
static const char kVeriSign_Universal_Root_Certification_AuthorityFingerprint[] =
"lnsM2T/O9/J84sJFdnrpsFp3awZJ+ZZbYpCWhGloaHI=";
/* Verisign Class 1 Public Primary Certification Authority - G3 */
static const char kVerisign_Class_1_Public_Primary_Certification_Authority___G3Fingerprint[] =
"IgduWu9Eu5pBaii30cRDItcFn2D+/6XK9sW+hEeJEwM=";
/* Verisign Class 2 Public Primary Certification Authority - G3 */
static const char kVerisign_Class_2_Public_Primary_Certification_Authority___G3Fingerprint[] =
"cAajgxHlj7GTSEIzIYIQxmEloOSoJq7VOaxWHfv72QM=";
/* Verisign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G3 */
static const char kVerisign_Class_3_Public_Primary_Certification_Authority___G3Fingerprint[] =
"SVqWumuteCQHvVIaALrOZXuzVVVeS7f4FGxxu6V+es4=";
/* YahooBackup1 */
static const char kYahooBackup1Fingerprint[] =
"2fRAUXyxl4A1/XHrKNBmc8bTkzA7y4FB/GLJuNAzCqY=";
/* YahooBackup2 */
static const char kYahooBackup2Fingerprint[] =
"dolnbtzEBnELx/9lOEQ22e6OZO/QNb6VSSX2XHA3E7A=";
/* thawte Primary Root CA */
static const char kthawte_Primary_Root_CAFingerprint[] =
"HXXQgxueCIU5TTLHob/bPbwcKOKw6DkfsTWYHbxbqTY=";
/* thawte Primary Root CA - G2 */
static const char kthawte_Primary_Root_CA___G2Fingerprint[] =
"Z9xPMvoQ59AaeaBzqgyeAhLsL/w9d54Kp/nA8OHCyJM=";
/* thawte Primary Root CA - G3 */
static const char kthawte_Primary_Root_CA___G3Fingerprint[] =
"GQbGEk27Q4V40A4GbVBUxsN/D6YCjAVUXgmU7drshik=";
/* Pinsets are each an ordered list by the actual value of the fingerprint */
struct StaticFingerprints {
const size_t size;
const char* const* data;
};
/* PreloadedHPKPins.json pinsets */
static const char* const kPinset_google_root_pems_Data[] = {
kEntrust_Root_Certification_Authority___EC1Fingerprint,
kComodo_Trusted_Services_rootFingerprint,
kCOMODO_ECC_Certification_AuthorityFingerprint,
kDigiCert_Assured_ID_Root_G2Fingerprint,
kCOMODO_Certification_AuthorityFingerprint,
kAddTrust_Low_Value_Services_RootFingerprint,
kGlobalSign_ECC_Root_CA___R4Fingerprint,
kGeoTrust_Global_CA_2Fingerprint,
kDigiCert_Assured_ID_Root_G3Fingerprint,
kStarfield_Class_2_CAFingerprint,
kthawte_Primary_Root_CA___G3Fingerprint,
kthawte_Primary_Root_CAFingerprint,
kEntrust_net_Premium_2048_Secure_Server_CAFingerprint,
kDigiCert_Assured_ID_Root_CAFingerprint,
kUSERTrust_ECC_Certification_AuthorityFingerprint,
kVeriSign_Class_3_Public_Primary_Certification_Authority___G5Fingerprint,
kGlobalSign_Root_CAFingerprint,
kGo_Daddy_Root_Certificate_Authority___G2Fingerprint,
kAffirmTrust_Premium_ECCFingerprint,
kAddTrust_Public_Services_RootFingerprint,
kComodo_Secure_Services_rootFingerprint,
kGeoTrust_Primary_Certification_AuthorityFingerprint,
kVerisign_Class_3_Public_Primary_Certification_Authority___G3Fingerprint,
kUTN_USERFirst_Hardware_Root_CAFingerprint,
kVeriSign_Class_3_Public_Primary_Certification_Authority___G4Fingerprint,
kGo_Daddy_Class_2_CAFingerprint,
kDigiCert_Trusted_Root_G4Fingerprint,
kDigiCert_High_Assurance_EV_Root_CAFingerprint,
kBaltimore_CyberTrust_RootFingerprint,
kthawte_Primary_Root_CA___G2Fingerprint,
kAffirmTrust_CommercialFingerprint,
kEntrust_Root_Certification_AuthorityFingerprint,
kGlobalSign_Root_CA___R3Fingerprint,
kEntrust_Root_Certification_Authority___G2Fingerprint,
kGeoTrust_Universal_CA_2Fingerprint,
kGlobalSign_ECC_Root_CA___R5Fingerprint,
kCybertrust_Global_RootFingerprint,
kStarfield_Root_Certificate_Authority___G2Fingerprint,
kCOMODO_RSA_Certification_AuthorityFingerprint,
kGeoTrust_Global_CAFingerprint,
kDigiCert_Global_Root_G2Fingerprint,
kGlobalSign_Root_CA___R2Fingerprint,
kAffirmTrust_NetworkingFingerprint,
kAddTrust_External_RootFingerprint,
kVeriSign_Universal_Root_Certification_AuthorityFingerprint,
kGeoTrust_Universal_CAFingerprint,
kGeoTrust_Primary_Certification_Authority___G3Fingerprint,
kDigiCert_Global_Root_CAFingerprint,
kDigiCert_Global_Root_G3Fingerprint,
kGeoTrust_Primary_Certification_Authority___G2Fingerprint,
kComodo_AAA_Services_rootFingerprint,
kAffirmTrust_PremiumFingerprint,
kUSERTrust_RSA_Certification_AuthorityFingerprint,
kAddTrust_Qualified_Certificates_RootFingerprint,
};
static const StaticFingerprints kPinset_google_root_pems = {
sizeof(kPinset_google_root_pems_Data) / sizeof(const char*),
kPinset_google_root_pems_Data
};
static const char* const kPinset_mozilla_Data[] = {
kGeoTrust_Global_CA_2Fingerprint,
kthawte_Primary_Root_CA___G3Fingerprint,
kthawte_Primary_Root_CAFingerprint,
kDigiCert_Assured_ID_Root_CAFingerprint,
kVerisign_Class_1_Public_Primary_Certification_Authority___G3Fingerprint,
kVeriSign_Class_3_Public_Primary_Certification_Authority___G5Fingerprint,
kGeoTrust_Primary_Certification_AuthorityFingerprint,
kVerisign_Class_3_Public_Primary_Certification_Authority___G3Fingerprint,
kVeriSign_Class_3_Public_Primary_Certification_Authority___G4Fingerprint,
kDigiCert_High_Assurance_EV_Root_CAFingerprint,
kBaltimore_CyberTrust_RootFingerprint,
kthawte_Primary_Root_CA___G2Fingerprint,
kVerisign_Class_2_Public_Primary_Certification_Authority___G3Fingerprint,
kGeoTrust_Universal_CA_2Fingerprint,
kGeoTrust_Global_CAFingerprint,
kVeriSign_Universal_Root_Certification_AuthorityFingerprint,
kGeoTrust_Universal_CAFingerprint,
kGeoTrust_Primary_Certification_Authority___G3Fingerprint,
kDigiCert_Global_Root_CAFingerprint,
kGeoTrust_Primary_Certification_Authority___G2Fingerprint,
};
static const StaticFingerprints kPinset_mozilla = {
sizeof(kPinset_mozilla_Data) / sizeof(const char*),
kPinset_mozilla_Data
};
static const char* const kPinset_mozilla_services_Data[] = {
kDigiCert_Global_Root_CAFingerprint,
};
static const StaticFingerprints kPinset_mozilla_services = {
sizeof(kPinset_mozilla_services_Data) / sizeof(const char*),
kPinset_mozilla_services_Data
};
static const char* const kPinset_mozilla_test_Data[] = {
kEnd_Entity_Test_CertFingerprint,
};
static const StaticFingerprints kPinset_mozilla_test = {
sizeof(kPinset_mozilla_test_Data) / sizeof(const char*),
kPinset_mozilla_test_Data
};
/* Chrome static pinsets */
static const char* const kPinset_test_Data[] = {
kTestSPKIFingerprint,
};
static const StaticFingerprints kPinset_test = {
sizeof(kPinset_test_Data) / sizeof(const char*),
kPinset_test_Data
};
static const char* const kPinset_google_Data[] = {
kGOOGLE_PIN_GoogleG2Fingerprint,
kGoogleBackup2048Fingerprint,
kGeoTrust_Global_CAFingerprint,
kGlobalSign_Root_CA___R2Fingerprint,
};
static const StaticFingerprints kPinset_google = {
sizeof(kPinset_google_Data) / sizeof(const char*),
kPinset_google_Data
};
static const char* const kPinset_tor_Data[] = {
kTor3Fingerprint,
kDigiCert_High_Assurance_EV_Root_CAFingerprint,
kGOOGLE_PIN_LetsEncryptAuthorityPrimary_X1_X3Fingerprint,
kTor1Fingerprint,
kGOOGLE_PIN_RapidSSLFingerprint,
kGOOGLE_PIN_LetsEncryptAuthorityBackup_X2_X4Fingerprint,
kTor2Fingerprint,
};
static const StaticFingerprints kPinset_tor = {
sizeof(kPinset_tor_Data) / sizeof(const char*),
kPinset_tor_Data
};
static const char* const kPinset_twitterCom_Data[] = {
kGOOGLE_PIN_VeriSignClass2_G2Fingerprint,
kGOOGLE_PIN_VeriSignClass3_G2Fingerprint,
kGeoTrust_Global_CA_2Fingerprint,
kDigiCert_Assured_ID_Root_CAFingerprint,
kVerisign_Class_1_Public_Primary_Certification_Authority___G3Fingerprint,
kVeriSign_Class_3_Public_Primary_Certification_Authority___G5Fingerprint,
kGOOGLE_PIN_VeriSignClass1Fingerprint,
kGeoTrust_Primary_Certification_AuthorityFingerprint,
kVerisign_Class_3_Public_Primary_Certification_Authority___G3Fingerprint,
kVeriSign_Class_3_Public_Primary_Certification_Authority___G4Fingerprint,
kGOOGLE_PIN_VeriSignClass4_G3Fingerprint,
kDigiCert_High_Assurance_EV_Root_CAFingerprint,
kVerisign_Class_2_Public_Primary_Certification_Authority___G3Fingerprint,
kGeoTrust_Universal_CA_2Fingerprint,
kGeoTrust_Global_CAFingerprint,
kVeriSign_Universal_Root_Certification_AuthorityFingerprint,
kGeoTrust_Universal_CAFingerprint,
kGeoTrust_Primary_Certification_Authority___G3Fingerprint,
kDigiCert_Global_Root_CAFingerprint,
kGeoTrust_Primary_Certification_Authority___G2Fingerprint,
kTwitter1Fingerprint,
};
static const StaticFingerprints kPinset_twitterCom = {
sizeof(kPinset_twitterCom_Data) / sizeof(const char*),
kPinset_twitterCom_Data
};
static const char* const kPinset_twitterCDN_Data[] = {
kGOOGLE_PIN_VeriSignClass2_G2Fingerprint,
kComodo_Trusted_Services_rootFingerprint,
kCOMODO_Certification_AuthorityFingerprint,
kGOOGLE_PIN_VeriSignClass3_G2Fingerprint,
kAddTrust_Low_Value_Services_RootFingerprint,
kUTN_USERFirst_Object_Root_CAFingerprint,
kGOOGLE_PIN_GTECyberTrustGlobalRootFingerprint,
kGeoTrust_Global_CA_2Fingerprint,
kEntrust_net_Premium_2048_Secure_Server_CAFingerprint,
kDigiCert_Assured_ID_Root_CAFingerprint,
kVerisign_Class_1_Public_Primary_Certification_Authority___G3Fingerprint,
kVeriSign_Class_3_Public_Primary_Certification_Authority___G5Fingerprint,
kGlobalSign_Root_CAFingerprint,
kUTN_USERFirst_Email_Root_CAFingerprint,
kGOOGLE_PIN_VeriSignClass1Fingerprint,
kAddTrust_Public_Services_RootFingerprint,
kGOOGLE_PIN_UTNDATACorpSGCFingerprint,
kComodo_Secure_Services_rootFingerprint,
kGeoTrust_Primary_Certification_AuthorityFingerprint,
kVerisign_Class_3_Public_Primary_Certification_Authority___G3Fingerprint,
kUTN_USERFirst_Hardware_Root_CAFingerprint,
kVeriSign_Class_3_Public_Primary_Certification_Authority___G4Fingerprint,
kGOOGLE_PIN_VeriSignClass4_G3Fingerprint,
kDigiCert_High_Assurance_EV_Root_CAFingerprint,
kBaltimore_CyberTrust_RootFingerprint,
kEntrust_Root_Certification_AuthorityFingerprint,
kVerisign_Class_2_Public_Primary_Certification_Authority___G3Fingerprint,
kGlobalSign_Root_CA___R3Fingerprint,
kEntrust_Root_Certification_Authority___G2Fingerprint,
kGeoTrust_Universal_CA_2Fingerprint,
kGeoTrust_Global_CAFingerprint,
kGlobalSign_Root_CA___R2Fingerprint,
kAddTrust_External_RootFingerprint,
kVeriSign_Universal_Root_Certification_AuthorityFingerprint,
kGeoTrust_Universal_CAFingerprint,
kGOOGLE_PIN_Entrust_SSLFingerprint,
kGeoTrust_Primary_Certification_Authority___G3Fingerprint,
kDigiCert_Global_Root_CAFingerprint,
kGeoTrust_Primary_Certification_Authority___G2Fingerprint,
kComodo_AAA_Services_rootFingerprint,
kTwitter1Fingerprint,
kAddTrust_Qualified_Certificates_RootFingerprint,
};
static const StaticFingerprints kPinset_twitterCDN = {
sizeof(kPinset_twitterCDN_Data) / sizeof(const char*),
kPinset_twitterCDN_Data
};
static const char* const kPinset_dropbox_Data[] = {
kEntrust_Root_Certification_Authority___EC1Fingerprint,
kEntrust_net_Premium_2048_Secure_Server_CAFingerprint,
kDigiCert_Assured_ID_Root_CAFingerprint,
kGo_Daddy_Root_Certificate_Authority___G2Fingerprint,
kGOOGLE_PIN_GoDaddySecureFingerprint,
kGo_Daddy_Class_2_CAFingerprint,
kDigiCert_High_Assurance_EV_Root_CAFingerprint,
kEntrust_Root_Certification_AuthorityFingerprint,
kEntrust_Root_Certification_Authority___G2Fingerprint,
kDigiCert_Global_Root_CAFingerprint,
};
static const StaticFingerprints kPinset_dropbox = {
sizeof(kPinset_dropbox_Data) / sizeof(const char*),
kPinset_dropbox_Data
};
static const char* const kPinset_facebook_Data[] = {
kGOOGLE_PIN_DigiCertECCSecureServerCAFingerprint,
kDigiCert_High_Assurance_EV_Root_CAFingerprint,
kGOOGLE_PIN_SymantecClass3EVG3Fingerprint,
kFacebookBackupFingerprint,
};
static const StaticFingerprints kPinset_facebook = {
sizeof(kPinset_facebook_Data) / sizeof(const char*),
kPinset_facebook_Data
};
static const char* const kPinset_spideroak_Data[] = {
kSpiderOak2Fingerprint,
kSpiderOak3Fingerprint,
kDigiCert_High_Assurance_EV_Root_CAFingerprint,
kGeoTrust_Global_CAFingerprint,
};
static const StaticFingerprints kPinset_spideroak = {
sizeof(kPinset_spideroak_Data) / sizeof(const char*),
kPinset_spideroak_Data
};
static const char* const kPinset_yahoo_Data[] = {
kYahooBackup1Fingerprint,
kGOOGLE_PIN_VeriSignClass2_G2Fingerprint,
kDigiCert_Assured_ID_Root_CAFingerprint,
kVeriSign_Class_3_Public_Primary_Certification_Authority___G5Fingerprint,
kVerisign_Class_3_Public_Primary_Certification_Authority___G3Fingerprint,
kVeriSign_Class_3_Public_Primary_Certification_Authority___G4Fingerprint,
kDigiCert_Trusted_Root_G4Fingerprint,
kDigiCert_High_Assurance_EV_Root_CAFingerprint,
kVerisign_Class_2_Public_Primary_Certification_Authority___G3Fingerprint,
kYahooBackup2Fingerprint,
kDigiCert_Global_Root_G2Fingerprint,
kVeriSign_Universal_Root_Certification_AuthorityFingerprint,
kDigiCert_Global_Root_CAFingerprint,
kDigiCert_Global_Root_G3Fingerprint,
};
static const StaticFingerprints kPinset_yahoo = {
sizeof(kPinset_yahoo_Data) / sizeof(const char*),
kPinset_yahoo_Data
};
static const char* const kPinset_swehackCom_Data[] = {
kSwehackFingerprint,
kDST_Root_CA_X3Fingerprint,
kGOOGLE_PIN_LetsEncryptAuthorityPrimary_X1_X3Fingerprint,
kGOOGLE_PIN_COMODORSADomainValidationSecureServerCAFingerprint,
kGOOGLE_PIN_LetsEncryptAuthorityBackup_X2_X4Fingerprint,
kSwehackBackupFingerprint,
};
static const StaticFingerprints kPinset_swehackCom = {
sizeof(kPinset_swehackCom_Data) / sizeof(const char*),
kPinset_swehackCom_Data
};
static const char* const kPinset_ncsccs_Data[] = {
kCOMODO_ECC_Certification_AuthorityFingerprint,
kDigiCert_Assured_ID_Root_CAFingerprint,
kDigiCert_High_Assurance_EV_Root_CAFingerprint,
kBaltimore_CyberTrust_RootFingerprint,
kGOOGLE_PIN_LetsEncryptAuthorityPrimary_X1_X3Fingerprint,
kCOMODO_RSA_Certification_AuthorityFingerprint,
kAddTrust_External_RootFingerprint,
kDigiCert_Global_Root_CAFingerprint,
kGOOGLE_PIN_LetsEncryptAuthorityBackup_X2_X4Fingerprint,
};
static const StaticFingerprints kPinset_ncsccs = {
sizeof(kPinset_ncsccs_Data) / sizeof(const char*),
kPinset_ncsccs_Data
};
static const char* const kPinset_tumblr_Data[] = {
kDigiCert_High_Assurance_EV_Root_CAFingerprint,
kTumblrBackupFingerprint,
kGOOGLE_PIN_DigiCertSHA2HighAssuranceServerCAFingerprint,
};
static const StaticFingerprints kPinset_tumblr = {
sizeof(kPinset_tumblr_Data) / sizeof(const char*),
kPinset_tumblr_Data
};
/* Domainlist */
struct TransportSecurityPreload {
const char* mHost;
const bool mIncludeSubdomains;
const bool mTestMode;
const bool mIsMoz;
const int32_t mId;
const StaticFingerprints* pinset;
};
/* Sort hostnames for binary search. */
static const TransportSecurityPreload kPublicKeyPinningPreloadList[] = {
{ "exclude-subdomains.pinning.example.com", false, false, false, 0, &kPinset_mozilla_test },
{ "include-subdomains.pinning.example.com", true, false, false, -1, &kPinset_mozilla_test },
{ "test-mode.pinning.example.com", true, true, false, -1, &kPinset_mozilla_test },
};
// Pinning Preload List Length = 3;
static const int32_t kUnknownId = -1;
static const PRTime kPreloadPKPinsExpirationTime = INT64_C(1609459199000000);

View File

@ -132,7 +132,6 @@ UNIFIED_SOURCES += [
'nsTLSSocketProvider.cpp',
'PSMContentListener.cpp',
'PSMRunnable.cpp',
'PublicKeyPinningService.cpp',
'SecretDecoderRing.cpp',
'SharedSSLState.cpp',
'SSLServerCertVerification.cpp',

View File

@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ namespace mozilla
interface nsISiteSecurityService : nsISupports
{
const uint32_t HEADER_HSTS = 0;
const uint32_t HEADER_HPKP = 1;
const uint32_t HEADER_HPKP = 1; /* no longer used */
const uint32_t HEADER_OMS = 2;
const uint32_t Success = 0;
@ -39,10 +39,10 @@ interface nsISiteSecurityService : nsISupports
const uint32_t ERROR_INVALID_MAX_AGE = 6;
const uint32_t ERROR_MULTIPLE_INCLUDE_SUBDOMAINS = 7;
const uint32_t ERROR_INVALID_INCLUDE_SUBDOMAINS = 8;
const uint32_t ERROR_INVALID_PIN = 9;
const uint32_t ERROR_MULTIPLE_REPORT_URIS = 10;
const uint32_t ERROR_PINSET_DOES_NOT_MATCH_CHAIN = 11;
const uint32_t ERROR_NO_BACKUP_PIN = 12;
const uint32_t ERROR_INVALID_PIN = 9; /* no longer used */
const uint32_t ERROR_MULTIPLE_REPORT_URIS = 10; /* no longer used */
const uint32_t ERROR_PINSET_DOES_NOT_MATCH_CHAIN = 11; /* no longer used */
const uint32_t ERROR_NO_BACKUP_PIN = 12; /* no longer used */
const uint32_t ERROR_COULD_NOT_SAVE_STATE = 13;
const uint32_t ERROR_ROOT_NOT_BUILT_IN = 14;
@ -150,42 +150,6 @@ interface nsISiteSecurityService : nsISupports
* settings.
*/
void clearAll();
/**
* Returns an array of sha256-hashed key pins for the given domain, if any.
* If these pins also apply to subdomains of the given domain,
* aIncludeSubdomains will be true. Pins returned are only for non-built-in
* pin entries.
*
* @param aHostname the hosname (punycode) to be queried about
* @param the time at which the pins should be valid. This is in
mozilla::pkix::Time which uses internally seconds since 0 AD.
* @param aPinArray the set of sha256-hashed key pins for the given domain
* @param aIncludeSubdomains true if the pins apply to subdomains of the
* given domain
*/
[noscript] boolean getKeyPinsForHostname(in string aHostname,
in mozillaPkixTime evalTime,
out nsCStringTArrayRef aPinArray,
out boolean aIncludeSubdomains);
/**
* Set public-key pins for a host. The resulting pins will be permanent
* and visible from private and non-private contexts. These pins replace
* any already set by this mechanism or those built-in to Gecko.
*
* @param aHost the hostname (punycode) that pins will apply to
* @param aIncludeSubdomains whether these pins also apply to subdomains
* @param aExpires the time this pin should expire (millis since epoch)
* @param aPinCount number of keys being pinnned
* @param aSha256Pins array of hashed key fingerprints (SHA-256, base64)
* @param aIsPreload are these key pins for a preload entry? (false by
* default)
*/
boolean setKeyPins(in string aHost, in boolean aIncludeSubdomains,
in int64_t aExpires, in unsigned long aPinCount,
[array, size_is(aPinCount)] in string aSha256Pins,
[optional] in boolean aIsPreload);
};
%{C++

View File

@ -25,7 +25,6 @@
#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
#include "prnetdb.h"
#include "prprf.h"
#include "PublicKeyPinningService.h"
#include "ScopedNSSTypes.h"
#include "SharedCertVerifier.h"
@ -86,123 +85,31 @@ SiteHSTSState::ToString(nsCString& aString)
aString.AppendInt(static_cast<uint32_t>(mHSTSIncludeSubdomains));
}
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
static bool
stringIsBase64EncodingOf256bitValue(nsCString& encodedString) {
nsAutoCString binaryValue;
nsresult rv = mozilla::Base64Decode(encodedString, binaryValue);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return false;
}
if (binaryValue.Length() != SHA256_LENGTH) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
SiteHPKPState::SiteHPKPState()
: mExpireTime(0)
, mState(SecurityPropertyUnset)
, mIncludeSubdomains(false)
{
}
SiteHPKPState::SiteHPKPState(nsCString& aStateString)
: mExpireTime(0)
, mState(SecurityPropertyUnset)
, mIncludeSubdomains(false)
{
uint32_t hpkpState = 0;
uint32_t hpkpIncludeSubdomains = 0; // PR_sscanf doesn't handle bools.
const uint32_t MaxMergedHPKPPinSize = 1024;
char mergedHPKPins[MaxMergedHPKPPinSize];
memset(mergedHPKPins, 0, MaxMergedHPKPPinSize);
if (aStateString.Length() >= MaxMergedHPKPPinSize) {
SSSLOG(("SSS: Cannot parse PKPState string, too large\n"));
return;
}
int32_t matches = PR_sscanf(aStateString.get(), "%lld,%lu,%lu,%s",
&mExpireTime, &hpkpState,
&hpkpIncludeSubdomains, mergedHPKPins);
bool valid = (matches == 4 &&
(hpkpIncludeSubdomains == 0 || hpkpIncludeSubdomains == 1) &&
((SecurityPropertyState)hpkpState == SecurityPropertyUnset ||
(SecurityPropertyState)hpkpState == SecurityPropertySet ||
(SecurityPropertyState)hpkpState == SecurityPropertyKnockout));
SSSLOG(("SSS: loading SiteHPKPState matches=%d\n", matches));
const uint32_t SHA256Base64Len = 44;
if (valid && (SecurityPropertyState)hpkpState == SecurityPropertySet) {
// try to expand the merged PKPins
const char* cur = mergedHPKPins;
nsAutoCString pin;
uint32_t collectedLen = 0;
mergedHPKPins[MaxMergedHPKPPinSize - 1] = 0;
size_t totalLen = strlen(mergedHPKPins);
while (collectedLen + SHA256Base64Len <= totalLen) {
pin.Assign(cur, SHA256Base64Len);
if (stringIsBase64EncodingOf256bitValue(pin)) {
mSHA256keys.AppendElement(pin);
}
cur += SHA256Base64Len;
collectedLen += SHA256Base64Len;
}
if (mSHA256keys.IsEmpty()) {
valid = false;
}
}
if (valid) {
mState = (SecurityPropertyState)hpkpState;
mIncludeSubdomains = (hpkpIncludeSubdomains == 1);
} else {
SSSLOG(("%s is not a valid SiteHPKPState", aStateString.get()));
mExpireTime = 0;
mState = SecurityPropertyUnset;
mIncludeSubdomains = false;
if (!mSHA256keys.IsEmpty()) {
mSHA256keys.Clear();
}
}
}
SiteHPKPState::SiteHPKPState(PRTime aExpireTime,
SecurityPropertyState aState,
bool aIncludeSubdomains,
nsTArray<nsCString>& aSHA256keys)
: mExpireTime(aExpireTime)
, mState(aState)
, mIncludeSubdomains(aIncludeSubdomains)
, mSHA256keys(aSHA256keys)
{
}
void
SiteHPKPState::ToString(nsCString& aString)
{
aString.Truncate();
aString.AppendInt(mExpireTime);
aString.Append(',');
aString.AppendInt(mState);
aString.Append(',');
aString.AppendInt(static_cast<uint32_t>(mIncludeSubdomains));
aString.Append(',');
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < mSHA256keys.Length(); i++) {
aString.Append(mSHA256keys[i]);
}
}
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
const uint64_t kSixtyDaysInSeconds = 60 * 24 * 60 * 60;
static bool
HostIsIPAddress(const char *hostname)
{
PRNetAddr hostAddr;
return (PR_StringToNetAddr(hostname, &hostAddr) == PR_SUCCESS);
}
nsAutoCString CanonicalizeHostname(const char* hostname)
{
nsAutoCString canonicalizedHostname(hostname);
ToLowerCase(canonicalizedHostname);
while (canonicalizedHostname.Length() > 0 &&
canonicalizedHostname.Last() == '.') {
canonicalizedHostname.Truncate(canonicalizedHostname.Length() - 1);
}
return canonicalizedHostname;
}
nsSiteSecurityService::nsSiteSecurityService()
: mMaxMaxAge(kSixtyDaysInSeconds)
, mUseStsService(true)
: mUseStsService(true)
, mPreloadListTimeOffset(0)
, mHPKPEnabled(false)
{
}
@ -223,30 +130,16 @@ nsSiteSecurityService::Init()
return NS_ERROR_NOT_SAME_THREAD;
}
mMaxMaxAge = mozilla::Preferences::GetInt(
"security.cert_pinning.max_max_age_seconds", kSixtyDaysInSeconds);
mozilla::Preferences::AddStrongObserver(this,
"security.cert_pinning.max_max_age_seconds");
mHPKPEnabled = mozilla::Preferences::GetBool(
"security.cert_pinning.hpkp.enabled", false);
mozilla::Preferences::AddStrongObserver(this,
"security.cert_pinning.hpkp.enabled");
mUseStsService = mozilla::Preferences::GetBool(
"network.stricttransportsecurity.enabled", true);
mozilla::Preferences::AddStrongObserver(this,
"network.stricttransportsecurity.enabled");
mProcessPKPHeadersFromNonBuiltInRoots = mozilla::Preferences::GetBool(
"security.cert_pinning.process_headers_from_non_builtin_roots", false);
mozilla::Preferences::AddStrongObserver(this,
"security.cert_pinning.process_headers_from_non_builtin_roots");
mPreloadListTimeOffset = mozilla::Preferences::GetInt(
"test.currentTimeOffsetSeconds", 0);
mozilla::Preferences::AddStrongObserver(this,
"test.currentTimeOffsetSeconds");
mSiteStateStorage =
mozilla::DataStorage::Get(NS_LITERAL_STRING("SiteSecurityServiceState.txt"));
mPreloadStateStorage =
mozilla::DataStorage::Get(NS_LITERAL_STRING("SecurityPreloadState.txt"));
bool storageWillPersist = false;
nsresult rv = mSiteStateStorage->Init(storageWillPersist);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
@ -276,7 +169,7 @@ nsSiteSecurityService::GetHost(nsIURI* aURI, nsACString& aResult)
return rv;
}
aResult.Assign(PublicKeyPinningService::CanonicalizeHostname(host.get()));
aResult.Assign(CanonicalizeHostname(host.get()));
if (aResult.IsEmpty()) {
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
@ -292,9 +185,6 @@ SetStorageKey(nsAutoCString& storageKey, nsCString& hostname, uint32_t aType)
case nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HSTS:
storageKey.AppendLiteral(":HSTS");
break;
case nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HPKP:
storageKey.AppendLiteral(":HPKP");
break;
default:
NS_ASSERTION(false, "SSS:SetStorageKey got invalid type");
}
@ -359,8 +249,7 @@ nsSiteSecurityService::RemoveState(uint32_t aType, nsIURI* aURI, uint32_t aFlags
}
// Only HSTS is supported at the moment.
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(aType == nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HSTS ||
aType == nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HPKP,
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(aType == nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HSTS,
NS_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
nsAutoCString hostname;
@ -379,13 +268,6 @@ nsSiteSecurityService::RemoveState(uint32_t aType, nsIURI* aURI, uint32_t aFlags
return NS_OK;
}
static bool
HostIsIPAddress(const char *hostname)
{
PRNetAddr hostAddr;
return (PR_StringToNetAddr(hostname, &hostAddr) == PR_SUCCESS);
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsSiteSecurityService::ProcessHeader(uint32_t aType,
nsIURI* aSourceURI,
@ -396,11 +278,6 @@ nsSiteSecurityService::ProcessHeader(uint32_t aType,
bool* aIncludeSubdomains,
uint32_t* aFailureResult)
{
// Child processes are not allowed direct access to this.
if (!XRE_IsParentProcess()) {
MOZ_CRASH("Child process: no direct access to nsISiteSecurityService::ProcessHeader");
}
if (aFailureResult) {
*aFailureResult = nsISiteSecurityService::ERROR_UNKNOWN;
}
@ -422,11 +299,6 @@ nsSiteSecurityService::UnsafeProcessHeader(uint32_t aType,
bool* aIncludeSubdomains,
uint32_t* aFailureResult)
{
// Child processes are not allowed direct access to this.
if (!XRE_IsParentProcess()) {
MOZ_CRASH("Child process: no direct access to nsISiteSecurityService::UnsafeProcessHeader");
}
return ProcessHeaderInternal(aType, aSourceURI, aHeader, nullptr, aFlags,
aMaxAge, aIncludeSubdomains, aFailureResult);
}
@ -444,9 +316,8 @@ nsSiteSecurityService::ProcessHeaderInternal(uint32_t aType,
if (aFailureResult) {
*aFailureResult = nsISiteSecurityService::ERROR_UNKNOWN;
}
// Only HSTS and HPKP are supported at the moment.
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(aType == nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HSTS ||
aType == nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HPKP,
// Only HSTS is supported at the moment.
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(aType == nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HSTS,
NS_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
if (aMaxAge != nullptr) {
@ -494,10 +365,6 @@ nsSiteSecurityService::ProcessHeaderInternal(uint32_t aType,
rv = ProcessSTSHeader(aSourceURI, aHeader, aFlags, aMaxAge,
aIncludeSubdomains, aFailureResult);
break;
case nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HPKP:
rv = ProcessPKPHeader(aSourceURI, aHeader, aSSLStatus, aFlags, aMaxAge,
aIncludeSubdomains, aFailureResult);
break;
default:
MOZ_CRASH("unexpected header type");
}
@ -513,9 +380,6 @@ ParseSSSHeaders(uint32_t aType,
uint64_t& maxAge,
nsTArray<nsCString>& sha256keys)
{
// Strict transport security and Public Key Pinning have very similar
// Header formats.
// "Strict-Transport-Security" ":" OWS
// STS-d *( OWS ";" OWS STS-d OWS)
//
@ -527,26 +391,6 @@ ParseSSSHeaders(uint32_t aType,
// includeSubDomains = [ "includeSubDomains" ]
//
// "Public-Key-Pins ":" OWS
// PKP-d *( OWS ";" OWS PKP-d OWS)
//
// ; PKP directive
// PKP-d = maxAge / includeSubDomains / reportUri / pin-directive
//
// maxAge = "max-age" "=" delta-seconds v-ext
//
// includeSubDomains = [ "includeSubDomains" ]
//
// reportURi = "report-uri" "=" quoted-string
//
// pin-directive = "pin-" token "=" quoted-string
//
// the only valid token currently specified is sha256
// the quoted string for a pin directive is the base64 encoding
// of the hash of the public key of the fingerprint
//
// The order of the directives is not significant.
// All directives must appear only once.
// Directive names are case-insensitive.
// The entire header is invalid if a directive not conforming to the
@ -558,8 +402,6 @@ ParseSSSHeaders(uint32_t aType,
NS_NAMED_LITERAL_CSTRING(max_age_var, "max-age");
NS_NAMED_LITERAL_CSTRING(include_subd_var, "includesubdomains");
NS_NAMED_LITERAL_CSTRING(pin_sha256_var, "pin-sha256");
NS_NAMED_LITERAL_CSTRING(report_uri_var, "report-uri");
nsSecurityHeaderParser parser(aHeader);
nsresult rv = parser.Parse();
@ -614,29 +456,7 @@ ParseSSSHeaders(uint32_t aType,
directive->mValue.get()));
return nsISiteSecurityService::ERROR_INVALID_INCLUDE_SUBDOMAINS;
}
} else if (aType == nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HPKP &&
directive->mName.Length() == pin_sha256_var.Length() &&
directive->mName.EqualsIgnoreCase(pin_sha256_var.get(),
pin_sha256_var.Length())) {
SSSLOG(("SSS: found pinning entry '%s' length=%d",
directive->mValue.get(), directive->mValue.Length()));
if (!stringIsBase64EncodingOf256bitValue(directive->mValue)) {
return nsISiteSecurityService::ERROR_INVALID_PIN;
}
sha256keys.AppendElement(directive->mValue);
} else if (aType == nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HPKP &&
directive->mName.Length() == report_uri_var.Length() &&
directive->mName.EqualsIgnoreCase(report_uri_var.get(),
report_uri_var.Length())) {
// We don't support the report-uri yet, but to avoid unrecognized
// directive warnings, we still have to handle its presence
if (foundReportURI) {
SSSLOG(("SSS: found two report-uri directives"));
return nsISiteSecurityService::ERROR_MULTIPLE_REPORT_URIS;
}
SSSLOG(("SSS: found report-uri directive"));
foundReportURI = true;
} else {
} else {
SSSLOG(("SSS: ignoring unrecognized directive '%s'",
directive->mName.get()));
foundUnrecognizedDirective = true;
@ -645,194 +465,6 @@ ParseSSSHeaders(uint32_t aType,
return nsISiteSecurityService::Success;
}
nsresult
nsSiteSecurityService::ProcessPKPHeader(nsIURI* aSourceURI,
const char* aHeader,
nsISSLStatus* aSSLStatus,
uint32_t aFlags,
uint64_t* aMaxAge,
bool* aIncludeSubdomains,
uint32_t* aFailureResult)
{
if (aFailureResult) {
*aFailureResult = nsISiteSecurityService::ERROR_UNKNOWN;
}
if (!mHPKPEnabled) {
SSSLOG(("SSS: HPKP disabled: not processing header '%s'", aHeader));
if (aMaxAge) {
*aMaxAge = 0;
}
if (aIncludeSubdomains) {
*aIncludeSubdomains = false;
}
return NS_OK;
}
SSSLOG(("SSS: processing HPKP header '%s'", aHeader));
NS_ENSURE_ARG(aSSLStatus);
const uint32_t aType = nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HPKP;
bool foundMaxAge = false;
bool foundIncludeSubdomains = false;
bool foundUnrecognizedDirective = false;
uint64_t maxAge = 0;
nsTArray<nsCString> sha256keys;
uint32_t sssrv = ParseSSSHeaders(aType, aHeader, foundIncludeSubdomains,
foundMaxAge, foundUnrecognizedDirective,
maxAge, sha256keys);
if (sssrv != nsISiteSecurityService::Success) {
if (aFailureResult) {
*aFailureResult = sssrv;
}
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
// after processing all the directives, make sure we came across max-age
// somewhere.
if (!foundMaxAge) {
SSSLOG(("SSS: did not encounter required max-age directive"));
if (aFailureResult) {
*aFailureResult = nsISiteSecurityService::ERROR_NO_MAX_AGE;
}
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
// before we add the pin we need to ensure it will not break the site as
// currently visited so:
// 1. recompute a valid chain (no external ocsp)
// 2. use this chain to check if things would have broken!
nsAutoCString host;
nsresult rv = GetHost(aSourceURI, host);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> cert;
rv = aSSLStatus->GetServerCert(getter_AddRefs(cert));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(cert, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
UniqueCERTCertificate nssCert(cert->GetCert());
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(nssCert, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
mozilla::pkix::Time now(mozilla::pkix::Now());
UniqueCERTCertList certList;
RefPtr<SharedCertVerifier> certVerifier(GetDefaultCertVerifier());
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(certVerifier, NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED);
// We don't want this verification to cause any network traffic that would
// block execution. Also, since we don't have access to the original stapled
// OCSP response, we can't enforce this aspect of the TLS Feature extension.
// This is ok, because it will have been enforced when we originally connected
// to the site (or it's disabled, in which case we wouldn't want to enforce it
// anyway).
CertVerifier::Flags flags = CertVerifier::FLAG_LOCAL_ONLY |
CertVerifier::FLAG_TLS_IGNORE_STATUS_REQUEST;
if (certVerifier->VerifySSLServerCert(nssCert,
nullptr, // stapledOCSPResponse
nullptr, // sctsFromTLSExtension
now, nullptr, // pinarg
host.get(), // hostname
certList,
false, // don't store intermediates
flags)
!= mozilla::pkix::Success) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
CERTCertListNode* rootNode = CERT_LIST_TAIL(certList);
if (CERT_LIST_END(rootNode, certList)) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
bool isBuiltIn = false;
mozilla::pkix::Result result = IsCertBuiltInRoot(rootNode->cert, isBuiltIn);
if (result != mozilla::pkix::Success) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
if (!isBuiltIn && !mProcessPKPHeadersFromNonBuiltInRoots) {
if (aFailureResult) {
*aFailureResult = nsISiteSecurityService::ERROR_ROOT_NOT_BUILT_IN;
}
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
// If maxAge == 0, we remove dynamic HPKP state for this host. Due to
// architectural constraints, if this host was preloaded, any future lookups
// will use the preloaded state (i.e. we can't store a "this host is not HPKP"
// entry like we can for HSTS).
if (maxAge == 0) {
return RemoveState(aType, aSourceURI, aFlags);
}
// clamp maxAge to the maximum set by pref
if (maxAge > mMaxMaxAge) {
maxAge = mMaxMaxAge;
}
bool chainMatchesPinset;
rv = PublicKeyPinningService::ChainMatchesPinset(certList, sha256keys,
chainMatchesPinset);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
if (!chainMatchesPinset) {
// is invalid
SSSLOG(("SSS: Pins provided by %s are invalid no match with certList\n", host.get()));
if (aFailureResult) {
*aFailureResult = nsISiteSecurityService::ERROR_PINSET_DOES_NOT_MATCH_CHAIN;
}
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
// finally we need to ensure that there is a "backup pin" ie. There must be
// at least one fingerprint hash that does NOT validate against the verified
// chain (Section 2.5 of the spec)
bool hasBackupPin = false;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < sha256keys.Length(); i++) {
nsTArray<nsCString> singlePin;
singlePin.AppendElement(sha256keys[i]);
rv = PublicKeyPinningService::ChainMatchesPinset(certList, singlePin,
chainMatchesPinset);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
if (!chainMatchesPinset) {
hasBackupPin = true;
}
}
if (!hasBackupPin) {
// is invalid
SSSLOG(("SSS: Pins provided by %s are invalid no backupPin\n", host.get()));
if (aFailureResult) {
*aFailureResult = nsISiteSecurityService::ERROR_NO_BACKUP_PIN;
}
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
int64_t expireTime = ExpireTimeFromMaxAge(maxAge);
SiteHPKPState dynamicEntry(expireTime, SecurityPropertySet,
foundIncludeSubdomains, sha256keys);
SSSLOG(("SSS: about to set pins for %s, expires=%ld now=%ld maxAge=%lu\n",
host.get(), expireTime, PR_Now() / PR_USEC_PER_MSEC, maxAge));
rv = SetHPKPState(host.get(), dynamicEntry, aFlags, false);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
SSSLOG(("SSS: failed to set pins for %s\n", host.get()));
if (aFailureResult) {
*aFailureResult = nsISiteSecurityService::ERROR_COULD_NOT_SAVE_STATE;
}
return rv;
}
if (aMaxAge != nullptr) {
*aMaxAge = maxAge;
}
if (aIncludeSubdomains != nullptr) {
*aIncludeSubdomains = foundIncludeSubdomains;
}
return foundUnrecognizedDirective
? NS_SUCCESS_LOSS_OF_INSIGNIFICANT_DATA
: NS_OK;
}
nsresult
nsSiteSecurityService::ProcessSTSHeader(nsIURI* aSourceURI,
const char* aHeader,
@ -902,17 +534,11 @@ nsSiteSecurityService::IsSecureURI(uint32_t aType, nsIURI* aURI,
uint32_t aFlags, bool* aCached,
bool* aResult)
{
// Child processes are not allowed direct access to this.
if (!XRE_IsParentProcess() && aType != nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HSTS) {
MOZ_CRASH("Child process: no direct access to nsISiteSecurityService::IsSecureURI for non-HSTS entries");
}
NS_ENSURE_ARG(aURI);
NS_ENSURE_ARG(aResult);
// Only HSTS and HPKP are supported at the moment.
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(aType == nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HSTS ||
aType == nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HPKP,
// Only HSTS is supported at the moment.
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(aType == nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HSTS,
NS_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
nsAutoCString hostname;
@ -939,17 +565,11 @@ nsSiteSecurityService::IsSecureHost(uint32_t aType, const char* aHost,
uint32_t aFlags, bool* aCached,
bool* aResult)
{
// Child processes are not allowed direct access to this.
if (!XRE_IsParentProcess() && aType != nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HSTS) {
MOZ_CRASH("Child process: no direct access to nsISiteSecurityService::IsSecureHost for non-HSTS entries");
}
NS_ENSURE_ARG(aHost);
NS_ENSURE_ARG(aResult);
// Only HSTS and HPKP are supported at the moment.
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(aType == nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HSTS ||
aType == nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HPKP,
// Only HSTS is supported at the moment.
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(aType == nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HSTS,
NS_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
// set default in case if we can't find any STS information
@ -963,36 +583,14 @@ nsSiteSecurityService::IsSecureHost(uint32_t aType, const char* aHost,
return NS_OK;
}
/* An IP address never qualifies as a secure URI. */
// An IP address never qualifies as a secure URI.
if (HostIsIPAddress(aHost)) {
return NS_OK;
}
if (aType == nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HPKP) {
RefPtr<SharedCertVerifier> certVerifier(GetDefaultCertVerifier());
if (!certVerifier) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
if (certVerifier->mPinningMode ==
CertVerifier::PinningMode::pinningDisabled) {
return NS_OK;
}
bool enforceTestMode = certVerifier->mPinningMode ==
CertVerifier::PinningMode::pinningEnforceTestMode;
return PublicKeyPinningService::HostHasPins(aHost, mozilla::pkix::Now(),
enforceTestMode, *aResult);
}
// Holepunch chart.apis.google.com and subdomains.
nsAutoCString host(PublicKeyPinningService::CanonicalizeHostname(aHost));
if (host.EqualsLiteral("chart.apis.google.com") ||
StringEndsWith(host, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(".chart.apis.google.com"))) {
if (aCached) {
*aCached = true;
}
return NS_OK;
}
// Canonicalize the passed host name
nsAutoCString host(CanonicalizeHostname(aHost));
// First check the exact host. This involves first checking for an entry in
// site security storage. If that entry exists, we don't want to check
// in the preload list. We only want to use the stored value if it is not a
@ -1088,144 +686,9 @@ nsSiteSecurityService::IsSecureHost(uint32_t aType, const char* aHost,
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsSiteSecurityService::ClearAll()
{
// Child processes are not allowed direct access to this.
if (!XRE_IsParentProcess()) {
MOZ_CRASH("Child process: no direct access to nsISiteSecurityService::ClearAll");
}
return mSiteStateStorage->Clear();
}
bool entryStateNotOK(SiteHPKPState& state, mozilla::pkix::Time& aEvalTime) {
return state.mState != SecurityPropertySet || state.IsExpired(aEvalTime) ||
state.mSHA256keys.Length() < 1;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsSiteSecurityService::GetKeyPinsForHostname(const char* aHostname,
mozilla::pkix::Time& aEvalTime,
/*out*/ nsTArray<nsCString>& pinArray,
/*out*/ bool* aIncludeSubdomains,
/*out*/ bool* aFound) {
// Child processes are not allowed direct access to this.
if (!XRE_IsParentProcess()) {
MOZ_CRASH("Child process: no direct access to nsISiteSecurityService::GetKeyPinsForHostname");
}
NS_ENSURE_ARG(aFound);
NS_ENSURE_ARG(aHostname);
if (!mHPKPEnabled) {
SSSLOG(("HPKP disabled - returning 'pins not found' for %s",
aHostname));
*aFound = false;
return NS_OK;
}
SSSLOG(("Top of GetKeyPinsForHostname for %s", aHostname));
*aFound = false;
*aIncludeSubdomains = false;
pinArray.Clear();
nsAutoCString host(PublicKeyPinningService::CanonicalizeHostname(aHostname));
nsAutoCString storageKey;
SetStorageKey(storageKey, host, nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HPKP);
SSSLOG(("storagekey '%s'\n", storageKey.get()));
mozilla::DataStorageType storageType = mozilla::DataStorage_Persistent;
nsCString value = mSiteStateStorage->Get(storageKey, storageType);
// decode now
SiteHPKPState foundEntry(value);
if (entryStateNotOK(foundEntry, aEvalTime)) {
// not in permanent storage, try now private
value = mSiteStateStorage->Get(storageKey, mozilla::DataStorage_Private);
SiteHPKPState privateEntry(value);
if (entryStateNotOK(privateEntry, aEvalTime)) {
// not in private storage, try dynamic preload
value = mPreloadStateStorage->Get(storageKey,
mozilla::DataStorage_Persistent);
SiteHPKPState preloadEntry(value);
if (entryStateNotOK(preloadEntry, aEvalTime)) {
return NS_OK;
}
foundEntry = preloadEntry;
} else {
foundEntry = privateEntry;
}
}
pinArray = foundEntry.mSHA256keys;
*aIncludeSubdomains = foundEntry.mIncludeSubdomains;
*aFound = true;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsSiteSecurityService::SetKeyPins(const char* aHost, bool aIncludeSubdomains,
int64_t aExpires, uint32_t aPinCount,
const char** aSha256Pins,
bool aIsPreload,
/*out*/ bool* aResult)
{
// Child processes are not allowed direct access to this.
if (!XRE_IsParentProcess()) {
MOZ_CRASH("Child process: no direct access to nsISiteSecurityService::SetKeyPins");
}
NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aHost);
NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aResult);
NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aSha256Pins);
if (!mHPKPEnabled) {
SSSLOG(("SSS: HPKP disabled: not setting pins"));
*aResult = false;
return NS_OK;
}
SSSLOG(("Top of SetPins"));
nsTArray<nsCString> sha256keys;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < aPinCount; i++) {
nsAutoCString pin(aSha256Pins[i]);
SSSLOG(("SetPins pin=%s\n", pin.get()));
if (!stringIsBase64EncodingOf256bitValue(pin)) {
return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
}
sha256keys.AppendElement(pin);
}
SiteHPKPState dynamicEntry(aExpires, SecurityPropertySet,
aIncludeSubdomains, sha256keys);
// we always store data in permanent storage (ie no flags)
nsAutoCString host(PublicKeyPinningService::CanonicalizeHostname(aHost));
return SetHPKPState(host.get(), dynamicEntry, 0, aIsPreload);
}
nsresult
nsSiteSecurityService::SetHPKPState(const char* aHost, SiteHPKPState& entry,
uint32_t aFlags, bool aIsPreload)
{
SSSLOG(("Top of SetPKPState"));
nsAutoCString host(aHost);
nsAutoCString storageKey;
SetStorageKey(storageKey, host, nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HPKP);
bool isPrivate = aFlags & nsISocketProvider::NO_PERMANENT_STORAGE;
mozilla::DataStorageType storageType = isPrivate
? mozilla::DataStorage_Private
: mozilla::DataStorage_Persistent;
nsAutoCString stateString;
entry.ToString(stateString);
nsresult rv;
if (aIsPreload) {
rv = mPreloadStateStorage->Put(storageKey, stateString, storageType);
} else {
rv = mSiteStateStorage->Put(storageKey, stateString, storageType);
}
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
return NS_OK;
}
//------------------------------------------------------------
// nsSiteSecurityService::nsIObserver
//------------------------------------------------------------
@ -1246,12 +709,6 @@ nsSiteSecurityService::Observe(nsISupports *subject,
"network.stricttransportsecurity.enabled", true);
mPreloadListTimeOffset =
mozilla::Preferences::GetInt("test.currentTimeOffsetSeconds", 0);
mHPKPEnabled = mozilla::Preferences::GetBool(
"security.cert_pinning.hpkp.enabled", false);
mProcessPKPHeadersFromNonBuiltInRoots = mozilla::Preferences::GetBool(
"security.cert_pinning.process_headers_from_non_builtin_roots", false);
mMaxMaxAge = mozilla::Preferences::GetInt(
"security.cert_pinning.max_max_age_seconds", kSixtyDaysInSeconds);
}
return NS_OK;

View File

@ -38,40 +38,6 @@ enum SecurityPropertyState {
SecurityPropertyNegative = 3,
};
/**
* SiteHPKPState: A utility class that encodes/decodes a string describing
* the public key pins of a site.
* HPKP state consists of:
* - Expiry time (PRTime (aka int64_t) in milliseconds)
* - A state flag (SecurityPropertyState, default SecurityPropertyUnset)
* - An include subdomains flag (bool, default false)
* - An array of sha-256 hashed base 64 encoded fingerprints of required keys
*/
class SiteHPKPState
{
public:
SiteHPKPState();
explicit SiteHPKPState(nsCString& aStateString);
SiteHPKPState(PRTime aExpireTime, SecurityPropertyState aState,
bool aIncludeSubdomains, nsTArray<nsCString>& SHA256keys);
PRTime mExpireTime;
SecurityPropertyState mState;
bool mIncludeSubdomains;
nsTArray<nsCString> mSHA256keys;
bool IsExpired(mozilla::pkix::Time aTime)
{
if (aTime > mozilla::pkix::TimeFromEpochInSeconds(mExpireTime /
PR_MSEC_PER_SEC)) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
void ToString(nsCString& aString);
};
/**
* SiteHSTSState: A utility class that encodes/decodes a string describing
* the security state of a site. Currently only handles HSTS.
@ -137,20 +103,10 @@ private:
nsresult ProcessSTSHeader(nsIURI* aSourceURI, const char* aHeader,
uint32_t flags, uint64_t* aMaxAge,
bool* aIncludeSubdomains, uint32_t* aFailureResult);
nsresult ProcessPKPHeader(nsIURI* aSourceURI, const char* aHeader,
nsISSLStatus* aSSLStatus, uint32_t flags,
uint64_t* aMaxAge, bool* aIncludeSubdomains,
uint32_t* aFailureResult);
nsresult SetHPKPState(const char* aHost, SiteHPKPState& entry, uint32_t flags,
bool aIsPreload);
uint64_t mMaxMaxAge;
bool mUseStsService;
int64_t mPreloadListTimeOffset;
bool mHPKPEnabled;
bool mProcessPKPHeadersFromNonBuiltInRoots;
RefPtr<mozilla::DataStorage> mSiteStateStorage;
RefPtr<mozilla::DataStorage> mPreloadStateStorage;
};
#endif // __nsSiteSecurityService_h__

View File

@ -1,266 +0,0 @@
// -*- indent-tabs-mode: nil; js-indent-level: 2 -*-
// This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
// License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
// file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
//
// For all cases, the acceptable pinset includes only certificates pinned to
// Test End Entity Cert (signed by issuer testCA). Other certificates
// are issued by otherCA, which is never in the pinset but is a user-specified
// trust anchor. This test covers multiple cases:
//
// Pinned domain include-subdomains.pinning.example.com includes subdomains
// - PASS: include-subdomains.pinning.example.com serves a correct cert
// - PASS: good.include-subdomains.pinning.example.com serves a correct cert
// - FAIL (strict): bad.include-subdomains.pinning.example.com serves a cert
// not in the pinset
// - PASS (mitm): bad.include-subdomains.pinning.example.com serves a cert not
// in the pinset, but issued by a user-specified trust domain
//
// Pinned domain exclude-subdomains.pinning.example.com excludes subdomains
// - PASS: exclude-subdomains.pinning.example.com serves a correct cert
// - FAIL: exclude-subdomains.pinning.example.com serves an incorrect cert
// (TODO: test using verifyCertNow)
// - PASS: sub.exclude-subdomains.pinning.example.com serves an incorrect cert
"use strict";
do_get_profile(); // must be called before getting nsIX509CertDB
const certdb = Cc["@mozilla.org/security/x509certdb;1"]
.getService(Ci.nsIX509CertDB);
function add_clear_override(host) {
add_test(function() {
let certOverrideService = Cc["@mozilla.org/security/certoverride;1"]
.getService(Ci.nsICertOverrideService);
certOverrideService.clearValidityOverride(host, 8443);
run_next_test();
});
}
function test_strict() {
// In strict mode, we always evaluate pinning data, regardless of whether the
// issuer is a built-in trust anchor. We only enforce pins that are not in
// test mode.
add_test(function() {
Services.prefs.setIntPref("security.cert_pinning.enforcement_level", 2);
run_next_test();
});
// Normally this is overridable. But, since we have pinning information for
// this host, we don't allow overrides.
add_prevented_cert_override_test(
"unknownissuer.include-subdomains.pinning.example.com",
Ci.nsICertOverrideService.ERROR_UNTRUSTED,
SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER);
add_clear_override("unknownissuer.include-subdomains.pinning.example.com");
// Issued by otherCA, which is not in the pinset for pinning.example.com.
add_connection_test("bad.include-subdomains.pinning.example.com",
MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_KEY_PINNING_FAILURE);
// Check that using a FQDN doesn't bypass pinning.
add_connection_test("bad.include-subdomains.pinning.example.com.",
MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_KEY_PINNING_FAILURE);
// For some reason this is also navigable (see bug 1118522).
add_connection_test("bad.include-subdomains.pinning.example.com..",
MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_KEY_PINNING_FAILURE);
// These domains serve certs that match the pinset.
add_connection_test("include-subdomains.pinning.example.com",
PRErrorCodeSuccess);
add_connection_test("good.include-subdomains.pinning.example.com",
PRErrorCodeSuccess);
add_connection_test("exclude-subdomains.pinning.example.com",
PRErrorCodeSuccess);
// This domain serves a cert that doesn't match the pinset, but subdomains
// are excluded.
add_connection_test("sub.exclude-subdomains.pinning.example.com",
PRErrorCodeSuccess);
// This domain's pinset is exactly the same as
// include-subdomains.pinning.example.com, serves the same cert as
// bad.include-subdomains.pinning.example.com, but it should pass because
// it's in test_mode.
add_connection_test("test-mode.pinning.example.com",
PRErrorCodeSuccess);
// Similarly, this pin is in test-mode, so it should be overridable.
add_cert_override_test("unknownissuer.test-mode.pinning.example.com",
Ci.nsICertOverrideService.ERROR_UNTRUSTED,
SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER);
add_clear_override("unknownissuer.test-mode.pinning.example.com");
}
function test_mitm() {
// In MITM mode, we allow pinning to pass if the chain resolves to any
// user-specified trust anchor, even if it is not in the pinset.
add_test(function() {
Services.prefs.setIntPref("security.cert_pinning.enforcement_level", 1);
run_next_test();
});
add_connection_test("include-subdomains.pinning.example.com",
PRErrorCodeSuccess);
add_connection_test("good.include-subdomains.pinning.example.com",
PRErrorCodeSuccess);
// Normally this is overridable. But, since we have pinning information for
// this host, we don't allow overrides (since building a trusted chain fails,
// we have no reason to believe this was issued by a user-added trust
// anchor, so we can't allow overrides for it).
add_prevented_cert_override_test(
"unknownissuer.include-subdomains.pinning.example.com",
Ci.nsICertOverrideService.ERROR_UNTRUSTED,
SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER);
add_clear_override("unknownissuer.include-subdomains.pinning.example.com");
// In this case, even though otherCA is not in the pinset, it is a
// user-specified trust anchor and the pinning check succeeds.
add_connection_test("bad.include-subdomains.pinning.example.com",
PRErrorCodeSuccess);
add_connection_test("exclude-subdomains.pinning.example.com",
PRErrorCodeSuccess);
add_connection_test("sub.exclude-subdomains.pinning.example.com",
PRErrorCodeSuccess);
add_connection_test("test-mode.pinning.example.com", PRErrorCodeSuccess);
add_cert_override_test("unknownissuer.test-mode.pinning.example.com",
Ci.nsICertOverrideService.ERROR_UNTRUSTED,
SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER);
add_clear_override("unknownissuer.test-mode.pinning.example.com");
}
function test_disabled() {
// Disable pinning.
add_test(function() {
Services.prefs.setIntPref("security.cert_pinning.enforcement_level", 0);
run_next_test();
});
add_connection_test("include-subdomains.pinning.example.com",
PRErrorCodeSuccess);
add_connection_test("good.include-subdomains.pinning.example.com",
PRErrorCodeSuccess);
add_connection_test("bad.include-subdomains.pinning.example.com",
PRErrorCodeSuccess);
add_connection_test("exclude-subdomains.pinning.example.com",
PRErrorCodeSuccess);
add_connection_test("sub.exclude-subdomains.pinning.example.com",
PRErrorCodeSuccess);
add_connection_test("test-mode.pinning.example.com", PRErrorCodeSuccess);
add_cert_override_test("unknownissuer.include-subdomains.pinning.example.com",
Ci.nsICertOverrideService.ERROR_UNTRUSTED,
SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER);
add_clear_override("unknownissuer.include-subdomains.pinning.example.com");
add_cert_override_test("unknownissuer.test-mode.pinning.example.com",
Ci.nsICertOverrideService.ERROR_UNTRUSTED,
SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER);
add_clear_override("unknownissuer.test-mode.pinning.example.com");
}
function test_enforce_test_mode() {
// In enforce test mode, we always enforce all pins, even test pins.
add_test(function() {
Services.prefs.setIntPref("security.cert_pinning.enforcement_level", 3);
run_next_test();
});
// Normally this is overridable. But, since we have pinning information for
// this host, we don't allow overrides.
add_prevented_cert_override_test(
"unknownissuer.include-subdomains.pinning.example.com",
Ci.nsICertOverrideService.ERROR_UNTRUSTED,
SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER);
add_clear_override("unknownissuer.include-subdomains.pinning.example.com");
// Issued by otherCA, which is not in the pinset for pinning.example.com.
add_connection_test("bad.include-subdomains.pinning.example.com",
MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_KEY_PINNING_FAILURE);
// These domains serve certs that match the pinset.
add_connection_test("include-subdomains.pinning.example.com",
PRErrorCodeSuccess);
add_connection_test("good.include-subdomains.pinning.example.com",
PRErrorCodeSuccess);
add_connection_test("exclude-subdomains.pinning.example.com",
PRErrorCodeSuccess);
// This domain serves a cert that doesn't match the pinset, but subdomains
// are excluded.
add_connection_test("sub.exclude-subdomains.pinning.example.com",
PRErrorCodeSuccess);
// This domain's pinset is exactly the same as
// include-subdomains.pinning.example.com, serves the same cert as
// bad.include-subdomains.pinning.example.com, is in test-mode, but we are
// enforcing test mode pins.
add_connection_test("test-mode.pinning.example.com",
MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_KEY_PINNING_FAILURE);
// Normally this is overridable. But, since we have pinning information for
// this host (and since we're enforcing test mode), we don't allow overrides.
add_prevented_cert_override_test(
"unknownissuer.test-mode.pinning.example.com",
Ci.nsICertOverrideService.ERROR_UNTRUSTED,
SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER);
add_clear_override("unknownissuer.test-mode.pinning.example.com");
}
function check_pinning_telemetry() {
let service = Cc["@mozilla.org/base/telemetry;1"].getService(Ci.nsITelemetry);
let prod_histogram = service.getHistogramById("CERT_PINNING_RESULTS")
.snapshot();
let test_histogram = service.getHistogramById("CERT_PINNING_TEST_RESULTS")
.snapshot();
// Because all of our test domains are pinned to user-specified trust
// anchors, effectively only strict mode and enforce test-mode get evaluated
equal(prod_histogram.counts[0], 4,
"Actual and expected prod (non-Mozilla) failure count should match");
equal(prod_histogram.counts[1], 4,
"Actual and expected prod (non-Mozilla) success count should match");
equal(test_histogram.counts[0], 2,
"Actual and expected test (non-Mozilla) failure count should match");
equal(test_histogram.counts[1], 0,
"Actual and expected test (non-Mozilla) success count should match");
let moz_prod_histogram = service.getHistogramById("CERT_PINNING_MOZ_RESULTS")
.snapshot();
let moz_test_histogram =
service.getHistogramById("CERT_PINNING_MOZ_TEST_RESULTS").snapshot();
equal(moz_prod_histogram.counts[0], 0,
"Actual and expected prod (Mozilla) failure count should match");
equal(moz_prod_histogram.counts[1], 0,
"Actual and expected prod (Mozilla) success count should match");
equal(moz_test_histogram.counts[0], 0,
"Actual and expected test (Mozilla) failure count should match");
equal(moz_test_histogram.counts[1], 0,
"Actual and expected test (Mozilla) success count should match");
let per_host_histogram =
service.getHistogramById("CERT_PINNING_MOZ_RESULTS_BY_HOST").snapshot();
equal(per_host_histogram.counts[0], 0,
"Actual and expected per host (Mozilla) failure count should match");
equal(per_host_histogram.counts[1], 2,
"Actual and expected per host (Mozilla) success count should match");
run_next_test();
}
function run_test() {
// Ensure that static pinning works when HPKP is disabled.
Services.prefs.setBoolPref("security.cert_pinning.hpkp.enabled", false);
add_tls_server_setup("BadCertServer", "bad_certs");
// Add a user-specified trust anchor.
addCertFromFile(certdb, "bad_certs/other-test-ca.pem", "CTu,u,u");
test_strict();
test_mitm();
test_disabled();
test_enforce_test_mode();
add_test(function () {
check_pinning_telemetry();
});
run_next_test();
}

View File

@ -1,243 +0,0 @@
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
"use strict";
// The purpose of this test is to create a site security service state file
// and see that the site security service reads it properly.
function writeLine(aLine, aOutputStream) {
aOutputStream.write(aLine, aLine.length);
}
var gSSService = null;
var gSSSStateSeen = false;
var gPreloadStateSeen = false;
var profileDir = do_get_profile();
var certdb;
function certFromFile(cert_name) {
return constructCertFromFile("test_pinning_dynamic/" + cert_name + ".pem");
}
function loadCert(cert_name, trust_string) {
let cert_filename = "test_pinning_dynamic/" + cert_name + ".pem";
addCertFromFile(certdb, cert_filename, trust_string);
return constructCertFromFile(cert_filename);
}
function checkOK(cert, hostname) {
return checkCertErrorGeneric(certdb, cert, PRErrorCodeSuccess,
certificateUsageSSLServer, {}, hostname);
}
function checkFail(cert, hostname) {
return checkCertErrorGeneric(certdb, cert, MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_KEY_PINNING_FAILURE,
certificateUsageSSLServer, {}, hostname);
}
const NON_ISSUED_KEY_HASH = "KHAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAN=";
const PINNING_ROOT_KEY_HASH = "VCIlmPM9NkgFQtrs4Oa5TeFcDu6MWRTKSNdePEhOgD8=";
function run_test() {
Services.prefs.setBoolPref("security.cert_pinning.hpkp.enabled", true);
Services.prefs.setIntPref("security.cert_pinning.enforcement_level", 2);
let stateFile = profileDir.clone();
stateFile.append(SSS_STATE_FILE_NAME);
// Assuming we're working with a clean slate, the SSS_STATE file shouldn't
// exist until we create it.
ok(!stateFile.exists(),
"State file should not exist when working with a clean slate");
let outputStream = FileUtils.openFileOutputStream(stateFile);
let now = (new Date()).getTime();
writeLine(`a.pinning2.example.com:HPKP\t0\t0\t${now + 100000},1,0,${PINNING_ROOT_KEY_HASH}\n`, outputStream);
writeLine(`b.pinning2.example.com:HPKP\t0\t0\t${now + 100000},1,1,${PINNING_ROOT_KEY_HASH}\n`, outputStream);
outputStream.close();
let preloadFile = profileDir.clone();
preloadFile.append(PRELOAD_STATE_FILE_NAME);
ok(!preloadFile.exists(),
"Preload file should not exist when working with a clean slate");
outputStream = FileUtils.openFileOutputStream(preloadFile);
writeLine(`a.preload.example.com:HPKP\t0\t0\t${now + 100000},1,1,${PINNING_ROOT_KEY_HASH}\n`, outputStream);
outputStream.close();
Services.obs.addObserver(checkStateRead, "data-storage-ready", false);
do_test_pending();
gSSService = Cc["@mozilla.org/ssservice;1"]
.getService(Ci.nsISiteSecurityService);
notEqual(gSSService, null,
"SiteSecurityService should have initialized successfully using" +
" the generated state file");
}
function checkDefaultSiteHPKPStatus() {
ok(gSSService.isSecureHost(Ci.nsISiteSecurityService.HEADER_HPKP,
"a.pinning2.example.com", 0),
"a.pinning2.example.com should have HPKP status");
ok(!gSSService.isSecureHost(Ci.nsISiteSecurityService.HEADER_HPKP,
"x.a.pinning2.example.com", 0),
"x.a.pinning2.example.com should not have HPKP status");
ok(gSSService.isSecureHost(Ci.nsISiteSecurityService.HEADER_HPKP,
"b.pinning2.example.com", 0),
"b.pinning2.example.com should have HPKP status");
ok(gSSService.isSecureHost(Ci.nsISiteSecurityService.HEADER_HPKP,
"x.b.pinning2.example.com", 0),
"x.b.pinning2.example.com should have HPKP status");
}
function checkStateRead(aSubject, aTopic, aData) {
if (aData == SSS_STATE_FILE_NAME) {
gSSSStateSeen = true;
} else if (aData == PRELOAD_STATE_FILE_NAME) {
gPreloadStateSeen = true;
} else {
throw new Error("Observed data should either be the Site Security " +
"Service state file name or the preload file name");
}
if (!gSSSStateSeen || !gPreloadStateSeen) {
return;
}
notEqual(gSSService, null, "SiteSecurityService should be initialized");
// Initializing the certificate DB will cause NSS-initialization, which in
// turn initializes the site security service. Since we're in part testing
// that the site security service correctly reads its state file, we have to
// make sure it doesn't start up before we've populated the file
certdb = Cc["@mozilla.org/security/x509certdb;1"]
.getService(Ci.nsIX509CertDB);
loadCert("pinningroot", "CTu,CTu,CTu");
loadCert("badca", "CTu,CTu,CTu");
// the written entry is for a.pinning2.example.com without subdomains
// and b.pinning2.example.com with subdomains
checkFail(certFromFile('a.pinning2.example.com-badca'), "a.pinning2.example.com");
checkOK(certFromFile('a.pinning2.example.com-pinningroot'), "a.pinning2.example.com");
checkOK(certFromFile('x.a.pinning2.example.com-badca'), "x.a.pinning2.example.com");
checkOK(certFromFile('x.a.pinning2.example.com-pinningroot'), "x.a.pinning2.example.com");
checkFail(certFromFile('b.pinning2.example.com-badca'), "b.pinning2.example.com");
checkOK(certFromFile('b.pinning2.example.com-pinningroot'), "b.pinning2.example.com");
checkFail(certFromFile('x.b.pinning2.example.com-badca'), "x.b.pinning2.example.com");
checkOK(certFromFile('x.b.pinning2.example.com-pinningroot'), "x.b.pinning2.example.com");
checkDefaultSiteHPKPStatus();
// add includeSubdomains to a.pinning2.example.com
gSSService.setKeyPins("a.pinning2.example.com", true,
new Date().getTime() + 1000000, 2,
[NON_ISSUED_KEY_HASH, PINNING_ROOT_KEY_HASH]);
checkFail(certFromFile('a.pinning2.example.com-badca'), "a.pinning2.example.com");
checkOK(certFromFile('a.pinning2.example.com-pinningroot'), "a.pinning2.example.com");
checkFail(certFromFile('x.a.pinning2.example.com-badca'), "x.a.pinning2.example.com");
checkOK(certFromFile('x.a.pinning2.example.com-pinningroot'), "x.a.pinning2.example.com");
checkFail(certFromFile('b.pinning2.example.com-badca'), "b.pinning2.example.com");
checkOK(certFromFile('b.pinning2.example.com-pinningroot'), "b.pinning2.example.com");
checkFail(certFromFile('x.b.pinning2.example.com-badca'), "x.b.pinning2.example.com");
checkOK(certFromFile('x.b.pinning2.example.com-pinningroot'), "x.b.pinning2.example.com");
ok(gSSService.isSecureHost(Ci.nsISiteSecurityService.HEADER_HPKP,
"a.pinning2.example.com", 0),
"a.pinning2.example.com should still have HPKP status after adding" +
" includeSubdomains to a.pinning2.example.com");
ok(gSSService.isSecureHost(Ci.nsISiteSecurityService.HEADER_HPKP,
"x.a.pinning2.example.com", 0),
"x.a.pinning2.example.com should now have HPKP status after adding" +
" includeSubdomains to a.pinning2.example.com");
// Now setpins without subdomains
gSSService.setKeyPins("a.pinning2.example.com", false,
new Date().getTime() + 1000000, 2,
[NON_ISSUED_KEY_HASH, PINNING_ROOT_KEY_HASH]);
checkFail(certFromFile('a.pinning2.example.com-badca'), "a.pinning2.example.com");
checkOK(certFromFile('a.pinning2.example.com-pinningroot'), "a.pinning2.example.com");
checkOK(certFromFile('x.a.pinning2.example.com-badca'), "x.a.pinning2.example.com");
checkOK(certFromFile('x.a.pinning2.example.com-pinningroot'), "x.a.pinning2.example.com");
checkFail(certFromFile('b.pinning2.example.com-badca'), "b.pinning2.example.com");
checkOK(certFromFile('b.pinning2.example.com-pinningroot'), "b.pinning2.example.com");
checkFail(certFromFile('x.b.pinning2.example.com-badca'), "x.b.pinning2.example.com");
checkOK(certFromFile('x.b.pinning2.example.com-pinningroot'), "x.b.pinning2.example.com");
checkDefaultSiteHPKPStatus();
// failure to insert new pin entry leaves previous pin behavior
throws(() => {
gSSService.setKeyPins("a.pinning2.example.com", true,
new Date().getTime() + 1000000, 1, ["not a hash"]);
}, /NS_ERROR_ILLEGAL_VALUE/, "Attempting to set an invalid pin should fail");
checkFail(certFromFile('a.pinning2.example.com-badca'), "a.pinning2.example.com");
checkOK(certFromFile('a.pinning2.example.com-pinningroot'), "a.pinning2.example.com");
checkOK(certFromFile('x.a.pinning2.example.com-badca'), "x.a.pinning2.example.com");
checkOK(certFromFile('x.a.pinning2.example.com-pinningroot'), "x.a.pinning2.example.com");
checkFail(certFromFile('b.pinning2.example.com-badca'), "b.pinning2.example.com");
checkOK(certFromFile('b.pinning2.example.com-pinningroot'), "b.pinning2.example.com");
checkFail(certFromFile('x.b.pinning2.example.com-badca'), "x.b.pinning2.example.com");
checkOK(certFromFile('x.b.pinning2.example.com-pinningroot'), "x.b.pinning2.example.com");
checkDefaultSiteHPKPStatus();
// Incorrect size results in failure
throws(() => {
gSSService.setKeyPins("a.pinning2.example.com", true,
new Date().getTime() + 1000000, 2, ["not a hash"]);
}, /NS_ERROR_XPC_NOT_ENOUGH_ELEMENTS_IN_ARRAY/,
"Attempting to set a pin with an incorrect size should fail");
// Ensure built-in pins work as expected
ok(!gSSService.isSecureHost(Ci.nsISiteSecurityService.HEADER_HPKP,
"nonexistent.example.com", 0),
"Not built-in nonexistent.example.com should not have HPKP status");
ok(gSSService.isSecureHost(Ci.nsISiteSecurityService.HEADER_HPKP,
"include-subdomains.pinning.example.com", 0),
"Built-in include-subdomains.pinning.example.com should have HPKP status");
gSSService.setKeyPins("a.pinning2.example.com", false, new Date().getTime(),
1, [NON_ISSUED_KEY_HASH]);
// Check that a preload pin loaded from file works as expected
checkFail(certFromFile("a.preload.example.com-badca"), "a.preload.example.com");
checkOK(certFromFile("a.preload.example.com-pinningroot"), "a.preload.example.com");
// Check a dynamic addition works as expected
// first, it should succeed with the badCA - because there's no pin
checkOK(certFromFile('b.preload.example.com-badca'), "b.preload.example.com");
// then we add a pin, and we should get a failure (ensuring the expiry is
// after the test timeout)
gSSService.setKeyPins("b.preload.example.com", false,
new Date().getTime() + 1000000, 2,
[NON_ISSUED_KEY_HASH, PINNING_ROOT_KEY_HASH], true);
checkFail(certFromFile('b.preload.example.com-badca'), "b.preload.example.com");
do_timeout(1250, checkExpiredState);
}
function checkExpiredState() {
checkOK(certFromFile('a.pinning2.example.com-badca'), "a.pinning2.example.com");
checkOK(certFromFile('a.pinning2.example.com-pinningroot'), "a.pinning2.example.com");
checkOK(certFromFile('x.a.pinning2.example.com-badca'), "x.a.pinning2.example.com");
checkOK(certFromFile('x.a.pinning2.example.com-pinningroot'), "x.a.pinning2.example.com");
checkFail(certFromFile('b.pinning2.example.com-badca'), "b.pinning2.example.com");
checkOK(certFromFile('b.pinning2.example.com-pinningroot'), "b.pinning2.example.com");
checkFail(certFromFile('x.b.pinning2.example.com-badca'), "x.b.pinning2.example.com");
checkOK(certFromFile('x.b.pinning2.example.com-pinningroot'), "x.b.pinning2.example.com");
checkPreloadClear();
}
function checkPreloadClear() {
// Check that the preloaded pins still work after private data is cleared
gSSService.clearAll();
checkFail(certFromFile('b.preload.example.com-badca'), "b.preload.example.com");
do_test_finished();
}

View File

@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

View File

@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
issuer:badca
subject:test end-entity
issuerKey:alternate
subjectKey:alternate
extension:subjectAlternativeName:a.pinning2.example.com

View File

@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

View File

@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
issuer:pinningroot
subject:test end-entity
subjectKey:alternate
extension:subjectAlternativeName:a.pinning2.example.com

View File

@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIC3DCCAcagAwIBAgIUKUG7kBZ72CvuLQ0uPfjKHLkKDQAwCwYJKoZIhvcNAQEL
MBAxDjAMBgNVBAMMBWJhZGNhMCIYDzIwMTUxMTI4MDAwMDAwWhgPMjAxODAyMDUw
MDAwMDBaMBoxGDAWBgNVBAMMD3Rlc3QgZW5kLWVudGl0eTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcN
AQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMF1xlJmCZ93CCpnkfG4dsN/XOU4sGxKzSKxy9Rv
plraKt1ByMJJisSjs8H2FIf0G2mJQb2ApRw8EgJExYSkxEgzBeUTjAEGzwi+moYn
YLrmoujzbyPF2YMTud+vN4NF2s5R1Nbc0qbLPMcG680wcOyYzOQKpZHXKVp/ccW+
ZmkdKy3+yElEWQvFo+pJ/ZOx11NAXxdzdpmVhmYlR5ftQmkIiAgRQiBpmIpD/uSM
5oeB3SK2ppzSg3UTH5MrEozihvp9JRwGKtJ+8Bbxh83VToMrNbiTD3S6kKqLx2Fn
JCqx/W1iFA0YxMC4xo/DdIRXMkrX3obmVS8dHhkdcSFo07sCAwEAAaMkMCIwIAYD
VR0RBBkwF4IVYS5wcmVsb2FkLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tMAsGCSqGSIb3DQEBCwOCAQEA
tx5YO8uvYac92scnMEswv4ZIslou8UYV/2mtxA+MaXf/g+MizOKeZgTI1+b9hR48
IDOgvrqPCbn1hKY6gb2gtRI1mC5dg9T8EYEXcC1TM+ncY/l4SZUjfMhzY2iOf62x
jhDqMMt4V5uaHUxVmJQI82X5qpxH3yJ3WOC87iGZNfMB8MSbLM3lxor9OHeTlTHQ
vPb/r7cLW+ikxirDGyBBvThkvDA/8qyN5Qp6Ae1BiPeEMoScNf3fChvNV6Jyb8g8
e9q0LnTlTuVgaDWtg7PVOxeiI+wf3Jhv9uqXQLX8JHZDKebLbQEkNcbR4DK/8wsP
uFhj0j8DY6+/YZbcF7Jgfw==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----

View File

@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
issuer:badca
subject:test end-entity
issuerKey:alternate
subjectKey:alternate
extension:subjectAlternativeName:a.preload.example.com

View File

@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIC4jCCAcygAwIBAgIURV3mf9Dz42lALe31OAm2SYbpFaEwCwYJKoZIhvcNAQEL
MBYxFDASBgNVBAMMC3Bpbm5pbmdyb290MCIYDzIwMTUxMTI4MDAwMDAwWhgPMjAx
ODAyMDUwMDAwMDBaMBoxGDAWBgNVBAMMD3Rlc3QgZW5kLWVudGl0eTCCASIwDQYJ
KoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMF1xlJmCZ93CCpnkfG4dsN/XOU4sGxK
zSKxy9RvplraKt1ByMJJisSjs8H2FIf0G2mJQb2ApRw8EgJExYSkxEgzBeUTjAEG
zwi+moYnYLrmoujzbyPF2YMTud+vN4NF2s5R1Nbc0qbLPMcG680wcOyYzOQKpZHX
KVp/ccW+ZmkdKy3+yElEWQvFo+pJ/ZOx11NAXxdzdpmVhmYlR5ftQmkIiAgRQiBp
mIpD/uSM5oeB3SK2ppzSg3UTH5MrEozihvp9JRwGKtJ+8Bbxh83VToMrNbiTD3S6
kKqLx2FnJCqx/W1iFA0YxMC4xo/DdIRXMkrX3obmVS8dHhkdcSFo07sCAwEAAaMk
MCIwIAYDVR0RBBkwF4IVYS5wcmVsb2FkLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tMAsGCSqGSIb3DQEB
CwOCAQEATOA0bbfg81JieQkTzr4oxBqPuFamtLSAsLpbKakikYQo2znMGNnHV7Xe
uxMGMhCIPRsiJ6jj6ZTQJNqQRKzXWEiBgREsarmJxA53ITIcO2cK2rqyetNAAwzZ
oViENmK3tLA5KT2VC9IGgMXdSE7IfXn+5yCdpKZ2ohwtkYHNkCbQIU+4KaCPa/dB
yAelZZPE0mVHJLkd5HoOsFmjFOBQuOkn9/AAOmkgBZIk1Dp833ywn/mnwLZdVsdV
+TjqWKenDJXxhO2+aCCtZbUVxKMn0TACpAA+rhjS5vigCyIZh7V4rxki9UXaOfVq
EVy4rFlRIYYtXV40HavDZoPgxuCHDw==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----

View File

@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
issuer:pinningroot
subject:test end-entity
subjectKey:alternate
extension:subjectAlternativeName:a.preload.example.com

View File

@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

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@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
issuer:badca
subject:test end-entity
issuerKey:alternate
subjectKey:alternate
extension:subjectAlternativeName:b.pinning2.example.com

View File

@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

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@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
issuer:pinningroot
subject:test end-entity
subjectKey:alternate
extension:subjectAlternativeName:b.pinning2.example.com

View File

@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

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@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
issuer:badca
subject:test end-entity
issuerKey:alternate
subjectKey:alternate
extension:subjectAlternativeName:b.preload.example.com

View File

@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

View File

@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
issuer:pinningroot
subject:test end-entity
subjectKey:alternate
extension:subjectAlternativeName:b.preload.example.com

View File

@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----

View File

@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
issuer:badca
subject:badca
issuerKey:alternate
subjectKey:alternate
extension:basicConstraints:cA,
extension:keyUsage:keyCertSign,cRLSign

View File

@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
# -*- Mode: python; indent-tabs-mode: nil; tab-width: 40 -*-
# vim: set filetype=python:
# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
# Temporarily disabled. See bug 1256495.
#test_certificates = (
# 'badca.pem',
# 'a.pinning2.example.com-badca.pem',
# 'a.pinning2.example.com-pinningroot.pem',
# 'a.preload.example.com-badca.pem',
# 'a.preload.example.com-pinningroot.pem',
# 'b.pinning2.example.com-badca.pem',
# 'b.pinning2.example.com-pinningroot.pem',
# 'b.preload.example.com-badca.pem',
# 'b.preload.example.com-pinningroot.pem',
# 'x.a.pinning2.example.com-badca.pem',
# 'x.a.pinning2.example.com-pinningroot.pem',
# 'x.b.pinning2.example.com-badca.pem',
# 'x.b.pinning2.example.com-pinningroot.pem',
# 'pinningroot.pem',
#)
#
#for test_certificate in test_certificates:
# GeneratedTestCertificate(test_certificate)

View File

@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

View File

@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
issuer:pinningroot
subject:pinningroot
extension:basicConstraints:cA,
extension:keyUsage:keyCertSign,cRLSign

View File

@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

View File

@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
issuer:badca
subject:test end-entity
issuerKey:alternate
subjectKey:alternate
extension:subjectAlternativeName:x.a.pinning2.example.com

View File

@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

View File

@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
issuer:pinningroot
subject:test end-entity
subjectKey:alternate
extension:subjectAlternativeName:x.a.pinning2.example.com

View File

@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIC3zCCAcmgAwIBAgIUYcTc5Pz7KlQldGOO+KzbuBdf8TswCwYJKoZIhvcNAQEL
MBAxDjAMBgNVBAMMBWJhZGNhMCIYDzIwMTUxMTI4MDAwMDAwWhgPMjAxODAyMDUw
MDAwMDBaMBoxGDAWBgNVBAMMD3Rlc3QgZW5kLWVudGl0eTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcN
AQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMF1xlJmCZ93CCpnkfG4dsN/XOU4sGxKzSKxy9Rv
plraKt1ByMJJisSjs8H2FIf0G2mJQb2ApRw8EgJExYSkxEgzBeUTjAEGzwi+moYn
YLrmoujzbyPF2YMTud+vN4NF2s5R1Nbc0qbLPMcG680wcOyYzOQKpZHXKVp/ccW+
ZmkdKy3+yElEWQvFo+pJ/ZOx11NAXxdzdpmVhmYlR5ftQmkIiAgRQiBpmIpD/uSM
5oeB3SK2ppzSg3UTH5MrEozihvp9JRwGKtJ+8Bbxh83VToMrNbiTD3S6kKqLx2Fn
JCqx/W1iFA0YxMC4xo/DdIRXMkrX3obmVS8dHhkdcSFo07sCAwEAAaMnMCUwIwYD
VR0RBBwwGoIYeC5iLnBpbm5pbmcyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tMAsGCSqGSIb3DQEBCwOC
AQEAd6HusXqftFBpSUzivIY6icTZ95+wY+xIOsf1QOgyzZ/CDx4Tly+rgue2xSNT
59FmnFvh8jW202K8TykamsAX20A8ArzubNoc/+soA752YEvrMmOgWjmH2arqTfqg
zcfNdgUDESwnOoy123F+PkT3rRDXwINzCwftxhKbvmqhO6YENteqyWWmSZoMClsJ
xtm+bmPN+m26k6zMMYWzIu2HIXI3CgqOmJltfyqea02Y58S1+XlajrcewPpC17xD
r5a1sizecCFrmV0ssbK8wvEYo9Xs+PNj8Vhi1DUwGjtnjrYn/WQ6v/luMEEO7EMD
b3BbEziS3Pqej2JyprUKqOjv1g==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----

View File

@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
issuer:badca
subject:test end-entity
issuerKey:alternate
subjectKey:alternate
extension:subjectAlternativeName:x.b.pinning2.example.com

View File

@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

View File

@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
issuer:pinningroot
subject:test end-entity
subjectKey:alternate
extension:subjectAlternativeName:x.b.pinning2.example.com

View File

@ -1,147 +0,0 @@
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
"use strict";
// The purpose of this test is to check that parsing of HPKP headers
// is correct.
var profileDir = do_get_profile();
const certdb = Cc["@mozilla.org/security/x509certdb;1"]
.getService(Ci.nsIX509CertDB);
var gSSService = Cc["@mozilla.org/ssservice;1"]
.getService(Ci.nsISiteSecurityService);
function certFromFile(cert_name) {
return constructCertFromFile("test_pinning_dynamic/" + cert_name + ".pem");
}
function loadCert(cert_name, trust_string) {
let cert_filename = "test_pinning_dynamic/" + cert_name + ".pem";
addCertFromFile(certdb, cert_filename, trust_string);
return constructCertFromFile(cert_filename);
}
function checkFailParseInvalidPin(pinValue) {
let sslStatus = new FakeSSLStatus(
certFromFile('a.pinning2.example.com-pinningroot'));
let uri = Services.io.newURI("https://a.pinning2.example.com", null, null);
throws(() => {
gSSService.processHeader(Ci.nsISiteSecurityService.HEADER_HPKP, uri,
pinValue, sslStatus, 0);
}, /NS_ERROR_FAILURE/, `Invalid pin "${pinValue}" should be rejected`);
}
function checkPassValidPin(pinValue, settingPin, expectedMaxAge) {
let sslStatus = new FakeSSLStatus(
certFromFile('a.pinning2.example.com-pinningroot'));
let uri = Services.io.newURI("https://a.pinning2.example.com", null, null);
let maxAge = {};
// setup preconditions for the test, if setting ensure there is no previous
// state, if removing ensure there is a valid pin in place.
if (settingPin) {
gSSService.removeState(Ci.nsISiteSecurityService.HEADER_HPKP, uri, 0);
} else {
// add a known valid pin!
let validPinValue = "max-age=5000;" + VALID_PIN1 + BACKUP_PIN1;
gSSService.processHeader(Ci.nsISiteSecurityService.HEADER_HPKP, uri,
validPinValue, sslStatus, 0);
}
try {
gSSService.processHeader(Ci.nsISiteSecurityService.HEADER_HPKP, uri,
pinValue, sslStatus, 0, maxAge);
ok(true, "Valid pin should be accepted");
} catch (e) {
ok(false, "Valid pin should have been accepted");
}
// check that maxAge was processed correctly
if (settingPin && expectedMaxAge) {
ok(maxAge.value == expectedMaxAge, `max-age value should be ${expectedMaxAge}`);
}
// after processing ensure that the postconditions are true, if setting
// the host must be pinned, if removing the host must not be pinned
let hostIsPinned = gSSService.isSecureHost(Ci.nsISiteSecurityService.HEADER_HPKP,
"a.pinning2.example.com", 0);
if (settingPin) {
ok(hostIsPinned, "Host should be considered pinned");
} else {
ok(!hostIsPinned, "Host should not be considered pinned");
}
}
function checkPassSettingPin(pinValue, expectedMaxAge) {
return checkPassValidPin(pinValue, true, expectedMaxAge);
}
function checkPassRemovingPin(pinValue) {
return checkPassValidPin(pinValue, false);
}
const MAX_MAX_AGE_SECONDS = 100000;
const GOOD_MAX_AGE_SECONDS = 69403;
const LONG_MAX_AGE_SECONDS = 2 * MAX_MAX_AGE_SECONDS;
const NON_ISSUED_KEY_HASH1 = "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=";
const NON_ISSUED_KEY_HASH2 = "ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ=";
const PINNING_ROOT_KEY_HASH = "VCIlmPM9NkgFQtrs4Oa5TeFcDu6MWRTKSNdePEhOgD8=";
const MAX_AGE_ZERO = "max-age=0;";
const VALID_PIN1 = `pin-sha256="${PINNING_ROOT_KEY_HASH}";`;
const BACKUP_PIN1 = `pin-sha256="${NON_ISSUED_KEY_HASH1}";`;
const BACKUP_PIN2 = `pin-sha256="${NON_ISSUED_KEY_HASH2}";`;
const BROKEN_PIN1 = "pin-sha256=\"jdjsjsjs\";";
const GOOD_MAX_AGE = `max-age=${GOOD_MAX_AGE_SECONDS};`;
const LONG_MAX_AGE = `max-age=${LONG_MAX_AGE_SECONDS};`;
const INCLUDE_SUBDOMAINS = "includeSubdomains;";
const REPORT_URI = "report-uri=\"https://www.example.com/report/\";";
const UNRECOGNIZED_DIRECTIVE = "unreconized-dir=12343;";
function run_test() {
Services.prefs.setBoolPref("security.cert_pinning.hpkp.enabled", true);
Services.prefs.setIntPref("security.cert_pinning.enforcement_level", 2);
Services.prefs.setIntPref("security.cert_pinning.max_max_age_seconds", MAX_MAX_AGE_SECONDS);
Services.prefs.setBoolPref("security.cert_pinning.process_headers_from_non_builtin_roots", true);
loadCert("pinningroot", "CTu,CTu,CTu");
loadCert("badca", "CTu,CTu,CTu");
checkFailParseInvalidPin("max-age=INVALID");
// check that incomplete headers are failure
checkFailParseInvalidPin(GOOD_MAX_AGE);
checkFailParseInvalidPin(VALID_PIN1);
checkFailParseInvalidPin(REPORT_URI);
checkFailParseInvalidPin(UNRECOGNIZED_DIRECTIVE);
checkFailParseInvalidPin(VALID_PIN1 + BACKUP_PIN1);
checkFailParseInvalidPin(GOOD_MAX_AGE + VALID_PIN1);
checkFailParseInvalidPin(GOOD_MAX_AGE + VALID_PIN1 + BROKEN_PIN1);
// next ensure a backup pin is present
checkFailParseInvalidPin(GOOD_MAX_AGE + VALID_PIN1 + VALID_PIN1);
// next section ensure duplicate directives result in failure
checkFailParseInvalidPin(GOOD_MAX_AGE + GOOD_MAX_AGE + VALID_PIN1 + BACKUP_PIN1);
checkFailParseInvalidPin(GOOD_MAX_AGE + VALID_PIN1 + BACKUP_PIN1 + INCLUDE_SUBDOMAINS + INCLUDE_SUBDOMAINS);
checkFailParseInvalidPin(GOOD_MAX_AGE + VALID_PIN1 + BACKUP_PIN1 + REPORT_URI + REPORT_URI);
checkFailParseInvalidPin("thisisinvalidtest");
checkFailParseInvalidPin("invalid" + GOOD_MAX_AGE + VALID_PIN1 + BACKUP_PIN1);
checkPassRemovingPin("max-age=0"); //test removal without terminating ';'
checkPassRemovingPin(MAX_AGE_ZERO);
checkPassRemovingPin(MAX_AGE_ZERO + VALID_PIN1);
checkPassSettingPin(GOOD_MAX_AGE + VALID_PIN1 + BACKUP_PIN1, GOOD_MAX_AGE_SECONDS);
checkPassSettingPin(LONG_MAX_AGE + VALID_PIN1 + BACKUP_PIN1, MAX_MAX_AGE_SECONDS);
checkPassRemovingPin(VALID_PIN1 + MAX_AGE_ZERO + VALID_PIN1);
checkPassSettingPin(GOOD_MAX_AGE + VALID_PIN1 + BACKUP_PIN1);
checkPassSettingPin(GOOD_MAX_AGE + VALID_PIN1 + BACKUP_PIN2);
checkPassSettingPin(GOOD_MAX_AGE + VALID_PIN1 + BACKUP_PIN2 + INCLUDE_SUBDOMAINS);
checkPassSettingPin(VALID_PIN1 + GOOD_MAX_AGE + BACKUP_PIN2 + INCLUDE_SUBDOMAINS);
checkPassSettingPin(VALID_PIN1 + GOOD_MAX_AGE + BACKUP_PIN2 + REPORT_URI + INCLUDE_SUBDOMAINS);
checkPassSettingPin(INCLUDE_SUBDOMAINS + VALID_PIN1 + GOOD_MAX_AGE + BACKUP_PIN2);
checkPassSettingPin(GOOD_MAX_AGE + VALID_PIN1 + BACKUP_PIN1 + UNRECOGNIZED_DIRECTIVE);
Services.prefs.clearUserPref("security.cert_pinning.hpkp.enabled");
Services.prefs.clearUserPref("security.cert_pinning.enforcement_level");
Services.prefs.clearUserPref("security.cert_pinning.max_max_age_seconds");
Services.prefs.clearUserPref("security.cert_pinning.process_headers_from_non_builtin_roots");
}

View File

@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
*/
"use strict";
// bug 961528: chart.apis.google.com doesn't handle https. Check that
// it isn't considered HSTS (other example.apis.google.com hosts should be
// HSTS as long as they're on the preload list, however).
function run_test() {
let SSService = Cc["@mozilla.org/ssservice;1"]
.getService(Ci.nsISiteSecurityService);
ok(!SSService.isSecureHost(Ci.nsISiteSecurityService.HEADER_HSTS,
"chart.apis.google.com", 0));
ok(!SSService.isSecureHost(Ci.nsISiteSecurityService.HEADER_HSTS,
"CHART.APIS.GOOGLE.COM", 0));
ok(!SSService.isSecureHost(Ci.nsISiteSecurityService.HEADER_HSTS,
"sub.chart.apis.google.com", 0));
ok(!SSService.isSecureHost(Ci.nsISiteSecurityService.HEADER_HSTS,
"SUB.CHART.APIS.GOOGLE.COM", 0));
ok(SSService.isSecureHost(Ci.nsISiteSecurityService.HEADER_HSTS,
"example.apis.google.com", 0));
ok(SSService.isSecureHost(Ci.nsISiteSecurityService.HEADER_HSTS,
"EXAMPLE.APIS.GOOGLE.COM", 0));
ok(SSService.isSecureHost(Ci.nsISiteSecurityService.HEADER_HSTS,
"sub.example.apis.google.com", 0));
ok(SSService.isSecureHost(Ci.nsISiteSecurityService.HEADER_HSTS,
"SUB.EXAMPLE.APIS.GOOGLE.COM", 0));
// also check isSecureURI
let chartURI = Services.io.newURI("http://chart.apis.google.com", null, null);
ok(!SSService.isSecureURI(Ci.nsISiteSecurityService.HEADER_HSTS, chartURI, 0));
let otherURI = Services.io.newURI("http://other.apis.google.com", null, null);
ok(SSService.isSecureURI(Ci.nsISiteSecurityService.HEADER_HSTS, otherURI, 0));
}

View File

@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ support-files =
test_ocsp_fetch_method/**
test_ocsp_url/**
test_onecrl/**
test_pinning_dynamic/**
test_signed_apps/**
test_signed_dir/**
test_startcom_wosign/**
@ -111,13 +110,6 @@ run-sequentially = hardcoded ports
[test_ocsp_url.js]
run-sequentially = hardcoded ports
[test_password_prompt.js]
[test_pinning.js]
run-sequentially = hardcoded ports
# This test can take longer than 300 seconds on B2G emulator debug builds, so
# give it enough time to finish. See bug 1081128.
requesttimeoutfactor = 2
[test_pinning_dynamic.js]
[test_pinning_header_parsing.js]
[test_sdr.js]
[test_session_resumption.js]
run-sequentially = hardcoded ports
@ -137,7 +129,6 @@ skip-if = toolkit == 'android'
[test_sss_savestate.js]
[test_startcom_wosign.js]
[test_sts_fqdn.js]
[test_sts_holepunch.js]
[test_sts_ipv4_ipv6.js]
[test_sts_preloadlist_perwindowpb.js]
[test_sts_preloadlist_selfdestruct.js]

View File

@ -1,222 +0,0 @@
// -*- Mode: javascript; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*-
// This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
// License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
// file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
// The top-level element is a dictionary with two keys: "pinsets" maps details
// of certificate pinning to a name and "entries" contains the HPKP details for
// each host.
//
// "pinsets" is a list of objects. Each object has the following members:
// name: (string) the name of the pinset
// sha256_hashes: (list of strings) the set of allowed SPKIs hashes
//
// For a given pinset, a certificate is accepted if at least one of the
// Subject Public Key Infos (SPKIs) is found in the chain. SPKIs are specified
// as names, which must match up with the name given in the Mozilla root store.
//
// "entries" is a list of objects. Each object has the following members:
// name: (string) the DNS name of the host in question
// include_subdomains: (optional bool) whether subdomains of |name| are also covered
// pins: (string) the |name| member of an object in |pinsets|
//
// "extra_certs" is a list of base64-encoded certificates. These are used in
// pinsets that reference certificates not in our root program (for example,
// Facebook).
// equifax -> aus3
// Geotrust Primary -> www.mozilla.org
// Geotrust Global -> *. addons.mozilla.org
{
"chromium_data" : {
"cert_file_url": "https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/net/+/master/http/transport_security_state_static.pins?format=TEXT",
"json_file_url": "https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/net/+/master/http/transport_security_state_static.json?format=TEXT",
"substitute_pinsets": {
// Use the larger google_root_pems pinset instead of google
"google": "google_root_pems"
},
"production_pinsets": [
"google_root_pems",
"facebook"
],
"production_domains": [
// Chrome's test domains.
"pinningtest.appspot.com",
"pinning-test.badssl.com",
// Dropbox
"dropbox.com",
"www.dropbox.com",
// Twitter
"api.twitter.com",
"business.twitter.com",
"dev.twitter.com",
"mobile.twitter.com",
"oauth.twitter.com",
"platform.twitter.com",
"twimg.com",
"www.twitter.com",
// Tor
"torproject.org",
"blog.torproject.org",
"check.torproject.org",
"dist.torproject.org",
"www.torproject.org",
// SpiderOak
"spideroak.com"
],
"exclude_domains" : [
// Chrome's entry for twitter.com doesn't include subdomains, so replace
// it with our own entry below which also uses an expanded pinset.
"twitter.com"
]
},
"pinsets": [
{
// From bug 772756, mozilla uses GeoTrust, Digicert and Thawte. Our
// cdn sites use Verisign and Baltimore. We exclude 1024-bit root certs
// from all providers. geotrust ca info:
// http://www.geotrust.com/resources/root-certificates/index.html
"name": "mozilla",
"sha256_hashes": [
"Baltimore CyberTrust Root",
"DigiCert Assured ID Root CA",
"DigiCert Global Root CA",
"DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA",
"GeoTrust Global CA",
"GeoTrust Global CA 2",
"GeoTrust Primary Certification Authority",
"GeoTrust Primary Certification Authority - G2",
"GeoTrust Primary Certification Authority - G3",
"GeoTrust Universal CA",
"GeoTrust Universal CA 2",
"thawte Primary Root CA",
"thawte Primary Root CA - G2",
"thawte Primary Root CA - G3",
"Verisign Class 1 Public Primary Certification Authority - G3",
"Verisign Class 2 Public Primary Certification Authority - G3",
"Verisign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G3",
"VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G4",
"VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5",
// "Verisign Class 4 Public Primary Certification Authority - G3",
"VeriSign Universal Root Certification Authority"
]
},
{
"name": "mozilla_services",
"sha256_hashes": [
"DigiCert Global Root CA"
]
},
// For pinning tests on pinning.example.com, the certificate must be 'End
// Entity Test Cert'
{
"name": "mozilla_test",
"sha256_hashes": [
"End Entity Test Cert"
]
},
// Google's root PEMs. Chrome pins only to their intermediate certs, but
// they'd like us to be more liberal. For the initial list, we are using
// the certs from http://pki.google.com/roots.pem.
// We have no built-in for commented out CAs.
{
"name": "google_root_pems",
"sha256_hashes": [
"AddTrust External Root",
"AddTrust Low-Value Services Root",
"AddTrust Public Services Root",
"AddTrust Qualified Certificates Root",
"AffirmTrust Commercial",
"AffirmTrust Networking",
"AffirmTrust Premium",
"AffirmTrust Premium ECC",
"Baltimore CyberTrust Root",
"Comodo AAA Services root",
"COMODO Certification Authority",
"COMODO ECC Certification Authority",
"COMODO RSA Certification Authority",
"Comodo Secure Services root",
"Comodo Trusted Services root",
"Cybertrust Global Root",
"DigiCert Assured ID Root CA",
"DigiCert Assured ID Root G2",
"DigiCert Assured ID Root G3",
"DigiCert Global Root CA",
"DigiCert Global Root G2",
"DigiCert Global Root G3",
"DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA",
"DigiCert Trusted Root G4",
"Entrust Root Certification Authority",
"Entrust Root Certification Authority - EC1",
"Entrust Root Certification Authority - G2",
"Entrust.net Premium 2048 Secure Server CA",
// "Equifax Secure Certificate Authority",
"GeoTrust Global CA",
"GeoTrust Global CA 2",
"GeoTrust Primary Certification Authority",
"GeoTrust Primary Certification Authority - G2",
"GeoTrust Primary Certification Authority - G3",
"GeoTrust Universal CA",
"GeoTrust Universal CA 2",
"GlobalSign ECC Root CA - R4",
"GlobalSign ECC Root CA - R5",
"GlobalSign Root CA",
"GlobalSign Root CA - R2",
"GlobalSign Root CA - R3",
"Go Daddy Class 2 CA",
"Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2",
"Starfield Class 2 CA",
"Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G2",
"thawte Primary Root CA",
"thawte Primary Root CA - G2",
"thawte Primary Root CA - G3",
"USERTrust ECC Certification Authority",
"USERTrust RSA Certification Authority",
"UTN USERFirst Hardware Root CA",
"Verisign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G3",
"VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G4",
"VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5",
"VeriSign Universal Root Certification Authority"
]
}
],
"entries": [
// Only domains that are operationally crucial to Firefox can have per-host
// telemetry reporting (the "id") field
{ "name": "addons.mozilla.org", "include_subdomains": true,
"pins": "mozilla", "test_mode": false, "id": 1 },
{ "name": "addons.mozilla.net", "include_subdomains": true,
"pins": "mozilla", "test_mode": false, "id": 2 },
{ "name": "aus4.mozilla.org", "include_subdomains": true,
"pins": "mozilla", "test_mode": true, "id": 3 },
{ "name": "accounts.firefox.com", "include_subdomains": true,
"pins": "mozilla_services", "test_mode": false, "id": 4 },
{ "name": "api.accounts.firefox.com", "include_subdomains": true,
"pins": "mozilla_services", "test_mode": false, "id": 5 },
{ "name": "cdn.mozilla.net", "include_subdomains": true,
"pins": "mozilla", "test_mode": false },
{ "name": "cdn.mozilla.org", "include_subdomains": true,
"pins": "mozilla", "test_mode": false },
{ "name": "services.mozilla.com", "include_subdomains": true,
"pins": "mozilla_services", "test_mode": false, "id": 6 },
{ "name": "include-subdomains.pinning.example.com",
"include_subdomains": true, "pins": "mozilla_test",
"test_mode": false },
// Example domain to collect per-host stats for telemetry tests.
{ "name": "exclude-subdomains.pinning.example.com",
"include_subdomains": false, "pins": "mozilla_test",
"test_mode": false, "id": 0 },
{ "name": "test-mode.pinning.example.com", "include_subdomains": true,
"pins": "mozilla_test", "test_mode": true },
// Expand twitter's pinset to include all of *.twitter.com and use
// twitterCDN. More specific rules take precedence because we search for
// exact domain name first.
{ "name": "twitter.com", "include_subdomains": true,
"pins": "twitterCDN", "test_mode": false },
{ "name": "aus5.mozilla.org", "include_subdomains": true,
"pins": "mozilla", "test_mode": true, "id": 7 }
],
"extra_certificates": []
}

View File

@ -1,630 +0,0 @@
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
// How to run this file:
// 1. [obtain firefox source code]
// 2. [build/obtain firefox binaries]
// 3. run `[path to]/run-mozilla.sh [path to]/xpcshell \
// [path to]/genHPKPStaticpins.js \
// [absolute path to]/PreloadedHPKPins.json \
// [an unused argument - see bug 1205406] \
// [absolute path to]/StaticHPKPins.h
"use strict";
if (arguments.length != 3) {
throw new Error("Usage: genHPKPStaticPins.js " +
"<absolute path to PreloadedHPKPins.json> " +
"<an unused argument - see bug 1205406> " +
"<absolute path to StaticHPKPins.h>");
}
var { 'classes': Cc, 'interfaces': Ci, 'utils': Cu, 'results': Cr } = Components;
var { NetUtil } = Cu.import("resource://gre/modules/NetUtil.jsm", {});
var { FileUtils } = Cu.import("resource://gre/modules/FileUtils.jsm", {});
var { Services } = Cu.import("resource://gre/modules/Services.jsm", {});
var gCertDB = Cc["@mozilla.org/security/x509certdb;1"]
.getService(Ci.nsIX509CertDB);
const BUILT_IN_NICK_PREFIX = "Builtin Object Token:";
const SHA256_PREFIX = "sha256/";
const GOOGLE_PIN_PREFIX = "GOOGLE_PIN_";
// Pins expire in 14 weeks (6 weeks on Beta + 8 weeks on stable)
const PINNING_MINIMUM_REQUIRED_MAX_AGE = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 14;
const FILE_HEADER = "/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public\n" +
" * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this\n" +
" * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */\n" +
"\n" +
"/*****************************************************************************/\n" +
"/* This is an automatically generated file. If you're not */\n" +
"/* PublicKeyPinningService.cpp, you shouldn't be #including it. */\n" +
"/*****************************************************************************/\n" +
"#include <stdint.h>" +
"\n";
const DOMAINHEADER = "/* Domainlist */\n" +
"struct TransportSecurityPreload {\n" +
" const char* mHost;\n" +
" const bool mIncludeSubdomains;\n" +
" const bool mTestMode;\n" +
" const bool mIsMoz;\n" +
" const int32_t mId;\n" +
" const StaticFingerprints* pinset;\n" +
"};\n\n";
const PINSETDEF = "/* Pinsets are each an ordered list by the actual value of the fingerprint */\n" +
"struct StaticFingerprints {\n" +
" const size_t size;\n" +
" const char* const* data;\n" +
"};\n\n";
// Command-line arguments
var gStaticPins = parseJson(arguments[0]);
// arguments[1] is ignored for now. See bug 1205406.
// Open the output file.
var file = Cc["@mozilla.org/file/local;1"].createInstance(Ci.nsILocalFile);
file.initWithPath(arguments[2]);
var gFileOutputStream = FileUtils.openSafeFileOutputStream(file);
function writeString(string) {
gFileOutputStream.write(string, string.length);
}
function readFileToString(filename) {
let file = Cc["@mozilla.org/file/local;1"].createInstance(Ci.nsILocalFile);
file.initWithPath(filename);
let stream = Cc["@mozilla.org/network/file-input-stream;1"]
.createInstance(Ci.nsIFileInputStream);
stream.init(file, -1, 0, 0);
let buf = NetUtil.readInputStreamToString(stream, stream.available());
return buf;
}
function stripComments(buf) {
let lines = buf.split("\n");
let entryRegex = /^\s*\/\//;
let data = "";
for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; ++i) {
let match = entryRegex.exec(lines[i]);
if (!match) {
data = data + lines[i];
}
}
return data;
}
function isBuiltinToken(tokenName) {
return tokenName == "Builtin Object Token";
}
function isCertBuiltIn(cert) {
let tokenNames = cert.getAllTokenNames({});
if (!tokenNames) {
return false;
}
if (tokenNames.some(isBuiltinToken)) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
function download(filename) {
let req = Cc["@mozilla.org/xmlextras/xmlhttprequest;1"]
.createInstance(Ci.nsIXMLHttpRequest);
req.open("GET", filename, false); // doing the request synchronously
try {
req.send();
}
catch (e) {
throw new Error(`ERROR: problem downloading '${filename}': ${e}`);
}
if (req.status != 200) {
throw new Error("ERROR: problem downloading '" + filename + "': status " +
req.status);
}
let resultDecoded;
try {
resultDecoded = atob(req.responseText);
}
catch (e) {
throw new Error("ERROR: could not decode data as base64 from '" + filename +
"': " + e);
}
return resultDecoded;
}
function downloadAsJson(filename) {
// we have to filter out '//' comments, while not mangling the json
let result = download(filename).replace(/^(\s*)?\/\/[^\n]*\n/mg, "");
let data = null;
try {
data = JSON.parse(result);
}
catch (e) {
throw new Error("ERROR: could not parse data from '" + filename + "': " + e);
}
return data;
}
// Returns a Subject Public Key Digest from the given pem, if it exists.
function getSKDFromPem(pem) {
let cert = gCertDB.constructX509FromBase64(pem, pem.length);
return cert.sha256SubjectPublicKeyInfoDigest;
}
/**
* Hashes |input| using the SHA-256 algorithm in the following manner:
* btoa(sha256(atob(input)))
*
* @argument {String} input Base64 string to decode and return the hash of.
* @returns {String} Base64 encoded SHA-256 hash.
*/
function sha256Base64(input) {
let decodedValue;
try {
decodedValue = atob(input);
}
catch (e) {
throw new Error(`ERROR: could not decode as base64: '${input}': ${e}`);
}
// Convert |decodedValue| to an array so that it can be hashed by the
// nsICryptoHash instance below.
// In most cases across the code base, convertToByteArray() of
// nsIScriptableUnicodeConverter is used to do this, but the method doesn't
// seem to work here.
let data = [];
for (let i = 0; i < decodedValue.length; i++) {
data[i] = decodedValue.charCodeAt(i);
}
let hasher = Cc["@mozilla.org/security/hash;1"]
.createInstance(Ci.nsICryptoHash);
hasher.init(hasher.SHA256);
hasher.update(data, data.length);
// true is passed so that the hasher returns a Base64 encoded string.
return hasher.finish(true);
}
// Downloads the static certs file and tries to map Google Chrome nicknames
// to Mozilla nicknames, as well as storing any hashes for pins for which we
// don't have root PEMs. Each entry consists of a line containing the name of
// the pin followed either by a hash in the format "sha256/" + base64(hash),
// a PEM encoded public key, or a PEM encoded certificate.
// For certificates that we have in our database,
// return a map of Google's nickname to ours. For ones that aren't return a
// map of Google's nickname to SHA-256 values. This code is modeled after agl's
// https://github.com/agl/transport-security-state-generate, which doesn't
// live in the Chromium repo because go is not an official language in
// Chromium.
// For all of the entries in this file:
// - If the entry has a hash format, find the Mozilla pin name (cert nickname)
// and stick the hash into certSKDToName
// - If the entry has a PEM format, parse the PEM, find the Mozilla pin name
// and stick the hash in certSKDToName
// We MUST be able to find a corresponding cert nickname for the Chrome names,
// otherwise we skip all pinsets referring to that Chrome name.
function downloadAndParseChromeCerts(filename, certNameToSKD, certSKDToName) {
// Prefixes that we care about.
const BEGIN_CERT = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----";
const END_CERT = "-----END CERTIFICATE-----";
const BEGIN_PUB_KEY = "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----";
const END_PUB_KEY = "-----END PUBLIC KEY-----";
// Parsing states.
const PRE_NAME = 0;
const POST_NAME = 1;
const IN_CERT = 2;
const IN_PUB_KEY = 3;
let state = PRE_NAME;
let lines = download(filename).split("\n");
let name = "";
let pemCert = "";
let pemPubKey = "";
let hash = "";
let chromeNameToHash = {};
let chromeNameToMozName = {};
let chromeName;
for (let line of lines) {
// Skip comments and newlines.
if (line.length == 0 || line[0] == '#') {
continue;
}
switch (state) {
case PRE_NAME:
chromeName = line;
state = POST_NAME;
break;
case POST_NAME:
if (line.startsWith(SHA256_PREFIX)) {
hash = line.substring(SHA256_PREFIX.length);
chromeNameToHash[chromeName] = hash;
certNameToSKD[chromeName] = hash;
certSKDToName[hash] = chromeName;
state = PRE_NAME;
} else if (line.startsWith(BEGIN_CERT)) {
state = IN_CERT;
} else if (line.startsWith(BEGIN_PUB_KEY)) {
state = IN_PUB_KEY;
} else {
throw new Error("ERROR: couldn't parse Chrome certificate file " +
"line: " + line);
}
break;
case IN_CERT:
if (line.startsWith(END_CERT)) {
state = PRE_NAME;
hash = getSKDFromPem(pemCert);
pemCert = "";
let mozName;
if (hash in certSKDToName) {
mozName = certSKDToName[hash];
} else {
// Not one of our built-in certs. Prefix the name with
// GOOGLE_PIN_.
mozName = GOOGLE_PIN_PREFIX + chromeName;
dump("Can't find hash in builtin certs for Chrome nickname " +
chromeName + ", inserting " + mozName + "\n");
certSKDToName[hash] = mozName;
certNameToSKD[mozName] = hash;
}
chromeNameToMozName[chromeName] = mozName;
} else {
pemCert += line;
}
break;
case IN_PUB_KEY:
if (line.startsWith(END_PUB_KEY)) {
state = PRE_NAME;
hash = sha256Base64(pemPubKey);
pemPubKey = "";
chromeNameToHash[chromeName] = hash;
certNameToSKD[chromeName] = hash;
certSKDToName[hash] = chromeName;
} else {
pemPubKey += line;
}
break;
default:
throw new Error("ERROR: couldn't parse Chrome certificate file " + line);
}
}
return [ chromeNameToHash, chromeNameToMozName ];
}
// We can only import pinsets from chrome if for every name in the pinset:
// - We have a hash from Chrome's static certificate file
// - We have a builtin cert
// If the pinset meets these requirements, we store a map array of pinset
// objects:
// {
// pinset_name : {
// // Array of names with entries in certNameToSKD
// sha256_hashes: []
// }
// }
// and an array of imported pinset entries:
// { name: string, include_subdomains: boolean, test_mode: boolean,
// pins: pinset_name }
function downloadAndParseChromePins(filename,
chromeNameToHash,
chromeNameToMozName,
certNameToSKD,
certSKDToName) {
let chromePreloads = downloadAsJson(filename);
let chromePins = chromePreloads.pinsets;
let chromeImportedPinsets = {};
let chromeImportedEntries = [];
chromePins.forEach(function(pin) {
let valid = true;
let pinset = { name: pin.name, sha256_hashes: [] };
// Translate the Chrome pinset format to ours
pin.static_spki_hashes.forEach(function(name) {
if (name in chromeNameToHash) {
let hash = chromeNameToHash[name];
pinset.sha256_hashes.push(certSKDToName[hash]);
// We should have already added hashes for all of these when we
// imported the certificate file.
if (!certNameToSKD[name]) {
throw new Error("ERROR: No hash for name: " + name);
}
} else if (name in chromeNameToMozName) {
pinset.sha256_hashes.push(chromeNameToMozName[name]);
} else {
dump("Skipping Chrome pinset " + pinset.name + ", couldn't find " +
"builtin " + name + " from cert file\n");
valid = false;
}
});
if (valid) {
chromeImportedPinsets[pinset.name] = pinset;
}
});
// Grab the domain entry lists. Chrome's entry format is similar to
// ours, except theirs includes a HSTS mode.
const cData = gStaticPins.chromium_data;
let entries = chromePreloads.entries;
entries.forEach(function(entry) {
// HSTS entry only
if (!entry.pins) {
return;
}
let pinsetName = cData.substitute_pinsets[entry.pins];
if (!pinsetName) {
pinsetName = entry.pins;
}
// We trim the entry name here to avoid breaking hostname comparisons in the
// HPKP implementation.
entry.name = entry.name.trim();
let isProductionDomain =
(cData.production_domains.indexOf(entry.name) != -1);
let isProductionPinset =
(cData.production_pinsets.indexOf(pinsetName) != -1);
let excludeDomain =
(cData.exclude_domains.indexOf(entry.name) != -1);
let isTestMode = !isProductionPinset && !isProductionDomain;
if (entry.pins && !excludeDomain && chromeImportedPinsets[entry.pins]) {
chromeImportedEntries.push({
name: entry.name,
include_subdomains: entry.include_subdomains,
test_mode: isTestMode,
is_moz: false,
pins: pinsetName });
}
});
return [ chromeImportedPinsets, chromeImportedEntries ];
}
// Returns a pair of maps [certNameToSKD, certSKDToName] between cert
// nicknames and digests of the SPKInfo for the mozilla trust store
function loadNSSCertinfo(extraCertificates) {
let allCerts = gCertDB.getCerts();
let enumerator = allCerts.getEnumerator();
let certNameToSKD = {};
let certSKDToName = {};
while (enumerator.hasMoreElements()) {
let cert = enumerator.getNext().QueryInterface(Ci.nsIX509Cert);
if (!isCertBuiltIn(cert)) {
continue;
}
let name = cert.nickname.substr(BUILT_IN_NICK_PREFIX.length);
let SKD = cert.sha256SubjectPublicKeyInfoDigest;
certNameToSKD[name] = SKD;
certSKDToName[SKD] = name;
}
for (let cert of extraCertificates) {
let name = cert.commonName;
let SKD = cert.sha256SubjectPublicKeyInfoDigest;
certNameToSKD[name] = SKD;
certSKDToName[SKD] = name;
}
{
// This is the pinning test certificate. The key hash identifies the
// default RSA key from pykey.
let name = "End Entity Test Cert";
let SKD = "VCIlmPM9NkgFQtrs4Oa5TeFcDu6MWRTKSNdePEhOgD8=";
certNameToSKD[name] = SKD;
certSKDToName[SKD] = name;
}
return [certNameToSKD, certSKDToName];
}
function parseJson(filename) {
let json = stripComments(readFileToString(filename));
return JSON.parse(json);
}
function nameToAlias(certName) {
// change the name to a string valid as a c identifier
// remove non-ascii characters
certName = certName.replace(/[^[:ascii:]]/g, "_");
// replace non word characters
certName = certName.replace(/[^A-Za-z0-9]/g, "_");
return "k" + certName + "Fingerprint";
}
function compareByName (a, b) {
return a.name.localeCompare(b.name);
}
function genExpirationTime() {
let now = new Date();
let nowMillis = now.getTime();
let expirationMillis = nowMillis + (PINNING_MINIMUM_REQUIRED_MAX_AGE * 1000);
let expirationMicros = expirationMillis * 1000;
return "static const PRTime kPreloadPKPinsExpirationTime = INT64_C(" +
expirationMicros + ");\n";
}
function writeFullPinset(certNameToSKD, certSKDToName, pinset) {
let prefix = "kPinset_" + pinset.name;
if (!pinset.sha256_hashes || pinset.sha256_hashes.length == 0) {
throw new Error(`ERROR: Pinset ${pinset.name} does not contain any hashes`);
}
writeFingerprints(certNameToSKD, certSKDToName, pinset.name,
pinset.sha256_hashes);
}
function writeFingerprints(certNameToSKD, certSKDToName, name, hashes) {
let varPrefix = "kPinset_" + name;
writeString("static const char* const " + varPrefix + "_Data[] = {\n");
let SKDList = [];
for (let certName of hashes) {
if (!(certName in certNameToSKD)) {
throw new Error(`ERROR: Can't find '${certName}' in certNameToSKD`);
}
SKDList.push(certNameToSKD[certName]);
}
for (let skd of SKDList.sort()) {
writeString(" " + nameToAlias(certSKDToName[skd]) + ",\n");
}
if (hashes.length == 0) {
// ANSI C requires that an initialiser list be non-empty.
writeString(" 0\n");
}
writeString("};\n");
writeString("static const StaticFingerprints " + varPrefix + " = {\n " +
"sizeof(" + varPrefix + "_Data) / sizeof(const char*),\n " + varPrefix +
"_Data\n};\n\n");
}
function writeEntry(entry) {
let printVal = " { \"" + entry.name + "\",\ ";
if (entry.include_subdomains) {
printVal += "true, ";
} else {
printVal += "false, ";
}
// Default to test mode if not specified.
let testMode = true;
if (entry.hasOwnProperty("test_mode")) {
testMode = entry.test_mode;
}
if (testMode) {
printVal += "true, ";
} else {
printVal += "false, ";
}
if (entry.is_moz || (entry.pins.indexOf("mozilla") != -1 &&
entry.pins != "mozilla_test")) {
printVal += "true, ";
} else {
printVal += "false, ";
}
if ("id" in entry) {
if (entry.id >= 256) {
throw new Error("ERROR: Not enough buckets in histogram");
}
if (entry.id >= 0) {
printVal += entry.id + ", ";
}
} else {
printVal += "-1, ";
}
printVal += "&kPinset_" + entry.pins;
printVal += " },\n";
writeString(printVal);
}
function writeDomainList(chromeImportedEntries) {
writeString("/* Sort hostnames for binary search. */\n");
writeString("static const TransportSecurityPreload " +
"kPublicKeyPinningPreloadList[] = {\n");
let count = 0;
let mozillaDomains = {};
gStaticPins.entries.forEach(function(entry) {
mozillaDomains[entry.name] = true;
});
// For any domain for which we have set pins, exclude them from
// chromeImportedEntries.
for (let i = chromeImportedEntries.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
if (mozillaDomains[chromeImportedEntries[i].name]) {
dump("Skipping duplicate pinset for domain " +
JSON.stringify(chromeImportedEntries[i], undefined, 2) + "\n");
chromeImportedEntries.splice(i, 1);
}
}
let sortedEntries = gStaticPins.entries;
sortedEntries.push.apply(sortedEntries, chromeImportedEntries);
for (let entry of sortedEntries.sort(compareByName)) {
count++;
writeEntry(entry);
}
writeString("};\n");
writeString("\n// Pinning Preload List Length = " + count + ";\n");
writeString("\nstatic const int32_t kUnknownId = -1;\n");
}
function writeFile(certNameToSKD, certSKDToName,
chromeImportedPinsets, chromeImportedEntries) {
// Compute used pins from both Chrome's and our pinsets, so we can output
// them later.
let usedFingerprints = {};
let mozillaPins = {};
gStaticPins.pinsets.forEach(function(pinset) {
mozillaPins[pinset.name] = true;
pinset.sha256_hashes.forEach(function (name) {
usedFingerprints[name] = true;
});
});
for (let key in chromeImportedPinsets) {
let pinset = chromeImportedPinsets[key];
pinset.sha256_hashes.forEach(function(name) {
usedFingerprints[name] = true;
});
}
writeString(FILE_HEADER);
// Write actual fingerprints.
Object.keys(usedFingerprints).sort().forEach(function(certName) {
if (certName) {
writeString("/* " + certName + " */\n");
writeString("static const char " + nameToAlias(certName) + "[] =\n");
writeString(" \"" + certNameToSKD[certName] + "\";\n");
writeString("\n");
}
});
// Write the pinsets
writeString(PINSETDEF);
writeString("/* PreloadedHPKPins.json pinsets */\n");
gStaticPins.pinsets.sort(compareByName).forEach(function(pinset) {
writeFullPinset(certNameToSKD, certSKDToName, pinset);
});
writeString("/* Chrome static pinsets */\n");
for (let key in chromeImportedPinsets) {
if (mozillaPins[key]) {
dump("Skipping duplicate pinset " + key + "\n");
} else {
dump("Writing pinset " + key + "\n");
writeFullPinset(certNameToSKD, certSKDToName, chromeImportedPinsets[key]);
}
}
// Write the domainlist entries.
writeString(DOMAINHEADER);
writeDomainList(chromeImportedEntries);
writeString("\n");
writeString(genExpirationTime());
}
function loadExtraCertificates(certStringList) {
let constructedCerts = [];
for (let certString of certStringList) {
constructedCerts.push(gCertDB.constructX509FromBase64(certString));
}
return constructedCerts;
}
var extraCertificates = loadExtraCertificates(gStaticPins.extra_certificates);
var [ certNameToSKD, certSKDToName ] = loadNSSCertinfo(extraCertificates);
var [ chromeNameToHash, chromeNameToMozName ] = downloadAndParseChromeCerts(
gStaticPins.chromium_data.cert_file_url, certNameToSKD, certSKDToName);
var [ chromeImportedPinsets, chromeImportedEntries ] =
downloadAndParseChromePins(gStaticPins.chromium_data.json_file_url,
chromeNameToHash, chromeNameToMozName, certNameToSKD, certSKDToName);
writeFile(certNameToSKD, certSKDToName, chromeImportedPinsets,
chromeImportedEntries);
FileUtils.closeSafeFileOutputStream(gFileOutputStream);

View File

@ -218,8 +218,8 @@ this.ForgetAboutSite = {
});
}));
// HSTS and HPKP
// TODO (bug 1290529): also remove HSTS/HPKP information for subdomains.
// HSTS
// TODO (bug 1290529): also remove HSTS information for subdomains.
// Since we can't enumerate the information in the site security service
// (bug 1115712), we can't implement this right now.
promises.push(Task.spawn(function*() {
@ -227,9 +227,8 @@ this.ForgetAboutSite = {
getService(Ci.nsISiteSecurityService);
let httpsURI = NetUtil.newURI("https://" + aDomain);
sss.removeState(Ci.nsISiteSecurityService.HEADER_HSTS, httpsURI, 0);
sss.removeState(Ci.nsISiteSecurityService.HEADER_HPKP, httpsURI, 0);
}).catch(ex => {
throw new Error("Exception thrown while clearing HSTS/HPKP: " + ex);
throw new Error("Exception thrown while clearing HSTS: " + ex);
}));
let ErrorCount = 0;